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ESSAYS
REPUTATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CHINA'S
SECURITIES MARKET
Benjamin L. Liebman*
Curtisj Milhaupt**
Literature suggests two distinct paths to stock market development: an
approach based on legal protections for investors, and an approach based on
self-regulation of listed companies by stock exchanges. This Essay traces
China's attempts to pursue both approaches, while focusing primarily on the
role of the stock exchanges as regulators. Specifically, the Essay examines a
fascinating but unstudied aspect of Chinese securities regulation--public
criticism of listed companies by the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges.
Based on both event study methodology and extensive interviews of market
actors, we find that the public criticisms have significant effects on listed
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The data in this Essay are generally based on our review of publicly available
information regarding public criticisms issued by the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock
exchanges, as well as regarding sanction decisions issued by the China Securities
Regulatory Commission ("CSRC"). CSRC sanctions are accessible at http://www.csrc.gov.
cn/n575458/n575742/n576221/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2008). Shenzhen Public
Criticisms are accessible from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Homepage at http://www.
szse.cn/main/disclosure/bulliten/cxda/cxdazy/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
Public criticisms from the Shanghai Stock Exchange are available from its homepage at
http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/webapp/datapresent/QueryCrediLInfoFKAct?report
Name=CreditlnfoRpt&CURSOR=l (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
Data on the total number of listed firms as of year-end were obtained and confirmed
from different sources, including the websites of the two stock exchanges and their annual
fact books, available for the Shanghai Stock Exchange at http://www.sse.com.cn/
sseportal/ps/zhs/yjcb/fact.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2008), and for the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange at http://www.szse.cn/main/marketdata/wbw/marketstat/ (last visited Feb. 26,
2008). Additionally, data were also obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook at http://
www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
The relevant portions of Chinese-language sources were substantively checked by a
Chinese-reading Columbia Law Review staff member. Some internet sources are no longer
available online, so their weblinks have not been included in the citation but are on file
with the Columbia Law Review. Due to the confidential nature of some interviews
conducted in connection with this Essay, the Columbia Law Review does not have copies of
these transcripts on file.
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companies and their executives. On both exchanges, significant abnormal
stock price returns occur in response to corporate disclosure of the underlying
misconduct giving rise to the criticisms, as well as in response to publications
of the criticisms themselves. Interviews suggest that the impact of the stock
exchange criticisms extends beyond the stock market, as banks and bank reg-
ulators make use of the sanction data for their own purposes. We evaluate
the role of public criticisms in China's evolving scheme of securities regula-
tion, contributing to several strands of research on the role of the media in
corporate governance, the use of shaming sanctions in corporate governance,
and the importance of informal mechanisms in supporting China's economic
growth.
INTRODUCTION
Developing a robust, well-regulated securities market is one of
China's biggest institution-building challenges today. Although the stock
market has grown considerably in size and stature in its short history, by
many measures China has considerable distance to travel before it can
claim to possess a truly functional capital market. The creation of a liq-
uid, transparent, and well-regulated securities market will be crucial to
the efficient pricing and allocation of capital and the growth of promis-
ing companies in the future. It is also critical to the sound investment of
China's enormous private savings.
Academic literature suggests two distinct paths to this goal. The law
and finance literature advanced by La Porta et al. ("LLSV") suggests that
stock markets grow in the presence of strong legal protections for inves-
tors:1 "Because a good legal environment protects the potential finan-
ciers against expropriation by entrepreneurs, it raises their willingness to
surrender funds in exchange for securities, and hence expands the scope
of capital markets."2 Many subsequent studies, including those focused
on developing and transition economies, have advocated high quality
state-supplied regulation as the key to healthy stock market
development.3
1. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52J. Fin. 1131, 1149-50 (1997).
2. Id. at 1149.
3. See, e.g., Simon Johnson, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach & Eric Friedman,
Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58J. Fin. Econ. 141, 184-85 (2000)
("[O]ur results ... suggest that the extent of exchange rate and stock market collapse in
response to a loss of confidence is affected by investor protection."). There is a debate in
the literature today about whether public or private enforcement of securities laws
contributes to more dispersed share ownership, but commentators on both sides
emphasize legal protections as central to stock market development. See Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Schleiver, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. Fin.
1, 28 (2006) (arguing that results "point to the need for legal reform to support financial
development, and cast doubt on the sufficiency of purely private solutions in bridging the
gap between countries with strong and weak investor protection"); Howell E. Jackson &
Mark J. Roe, Public Enforcement of Securities Laws: Preliminary Evidence 4 (Aug. 8,
2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1000086 (cautioning that "regression results linking private
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A second line of literature focuses on the role of a private actor-the
securities exchange-as the provider of investor protection needed for
stock market growth. John Coffee, for example, argues that well before
the passage of the federal securities laws in the 1930s, the United States
enjoyed large and liquid securities markets because the New York Stock
Exchange created rules that provided investor protection.4 Taking this
claim a step further, other scholars have argued that stock exchanges are
not only the first historically, but also the most effective regulators of stock
market disclosure and behavior. 5 The argument is that stock exchanges,
which are typically owned by their members, have strong incentives to
adopt rules that meet the needs of investors. One commentator recom-
mends "countries that are at or close to square one-those without an
established system of securities regulation-would thus be well advised to
[transfer a large portion of regulatory power to securities exchanges]. "6
China's unique political and institutional infrastructure makes
straightforward application of either strand of this policy advice difficult.
Political obstacles and weaknesses in basic law enforcement infrastructure
constrain the legal approach. 7 At the same time, China's two stock ex-
changes are not independent of the state and lack significant autono-
mous regulatory authority, undermining their capacity as self-regulatory
organizations. Notwithstanding these obstacles, China has pursued both
legal enforcement and the self-regulatory function of the stock exchanges
as integral parts of its capital market developmental strategy. Not surpris-
ingly, the results to date have been mixed. China's stock market has
grown to be the fifth largest in the world on the basis of market capitaliza-
tion, but it remains underdeveloped in view of China's economic heft
and potential, and it suffers from serious problems of fraud, poor disclo-
sure, inefficient pricing, and weak enforcement.
enforcement variables and corporate law quality variables . . . with favorable financial
outcomes... [should not] lead policymakers to promote private enforcement rules and
institutions to the detriment of public enforcement institutions").
4. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and
the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1, 34-39 (2001)
("[F]or a variety of path-dependent reasons, the NYSE organized itself as an exclusive,
high-quality securities market that would list only securities that were suitable for the
public investor . . ").
5. E.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1453, 1455
(1997) ("[T]he benefits of regulatory competition would be most effectively achieved by
devolving more regulatory authority to the bodies that were the first regulators-the
securities exchanges themselves."); see also A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A
Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 Va. L.
Rev. 925, 1020 (1999) ("An exchange-based antifraud regime harnesses the markets
themselves as effective, low-cost monitors for fraud.").
6. Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities Regulation,
83 Va. L. Rev. 1509, 1518 (1997).
7. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition
Economies: Lessons from China, 7 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 184, 185 (2005) ('China has only
slowly developed a legal framework for stock markets and has a weak law enforcement
record.").
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Thus far, the legal approach to stock market regulation in China has
received most of the academic attention.8 In this paper, we focus on the
role of the stock exchanges as providers of investor protection. We ex-
plore a novel but unstudied form of securities regulation in China-pub-
lic shaming sanctions imposed on listed companies by the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. 9 We have data on public criticisms of listed
companies imposed by the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges
from 2001 to 2006. To explore the impact of the public criticisms on
sanctioned firms and directors, we combine event study methodology
with qualitative assessments of data and interviews of market participants
and regulators.
Our study is related to several different strands of research. In addi-
tion to the literature, just discussed, on stock market development, the
Chinese case contributes to a small body of literature on the use of sham-
ing sanctions as a corporate governance tool. 10 To date, that literature
has focused almost exclusively on the United States. But the United
States, with its relatively efficient stock market and comparatively robust
set of corporate and securities law enforcement institutions, may not pro-
vide the best environment in which to consider the effectiveness of
reputational sanctions on corporate behavior. China, with a compara-
tively underdeveloped legal system, may offer a better setting in which to
examine the role of reputational sanctions in corporate governance.1 '
Indeed, recent research has emphasized the role of reputational mecha-
nisms in buttressing poorly developed formal governance institutions to
support economic growth in China. 1 2 Exploration of the use of stock
exchange criticisms in China also contributes to a nascent literature on
8. See, e.g., Walter Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China: Material
Disclosure About China's Legal System?, 24 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 599 (2003).
9. We are aware of only one substantive paper in English that discusses the shaming
sanctions. See Gongmeng Chen, Michael Firth, Daniel N. Gao & Oliver M. Rui, Is China's
Securities Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger? Evidence from Enforcement Actions, 24J.
Acct. & Pub. Pol'y 451 (2005) [hereinafter Chen et al., Toothless Tiger]. The limited
Chinese-language academic literature that mentions exchange sanctions likewise treats
shaming sanctions largely in passing.
10. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A
Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & Econ. 365, 368-83
(1999) (weighing merits of shaming sanctions); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate
Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1811, 1823-34 (2001) (same).
11. The literature on norms and corporate law supports the conjecture that China
provides fruitful ground for an inquiry of this sort. For example, Bernard Black has shown
that the market rewards firms that signal willingness to abide by norms of good corporate
governance in Russia, where law and governance standards are weak. Bernard Black, Does
Corporate Governance Matter? A Crude Test Using Russian Data, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2131,
2133 (2001) ("The correlation between . . . firms' value ratios and their corporate
governance rankings ... is striking."); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A
Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2151, 2175 (2001) (concluding that "norms
may matter most when law is weakest").
12. Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in
China, 77 J. Fin. Econ. 57, 59 (2005) [hereinafter Allen et al., Economic Growth]
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the role of the media in corporate governance.1 3 As we will show, domes-
tic media coverage of the sanctions of affected firms and individuals
serves as an important mechanism of discipline, particularly in the
Chinese context. Finally, our research is broadly consistent with an
emerging scholarly view which identifies devolution of authority, regula-
tory polycentrism, and experimentation as key features of China's process
of legal institution-building to date.
Part I sets the stage for our discussion by describing stock market
development in China on a comparative scale, outlining the steps taken
thus far to build a regulatory environment for capital markets in China
(including both legal and stock market approaches), and assessing the
limitations of these approaches to date.
Part II explores the use of public shaming sanctions by the stock ex-
changes as a means of improving corporate governance in China. We
present data on public criticisms of companies and individuals imposed
by the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2001 through
2006. We examine the extent to which use of public criticisms represents
a delegation of regulatory authority by the China Securities and
Exchange Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to the stock exchanges and
consider the possible emergence of regulatory competition between the
exchanges.
In Part III, we attempt to discern the effect of the public criticisms
from a variety of different perspectives. We examine the effect of the
criticisms on stock price, financing options, and the reputation of individ-
ual executives as well as the corporation itself. Our analysis suggests that
public criticisms do matter to a variety of constituencies in China. Moreo-
ver, other Chinese regulatory actors have begun using public criticisms as
a touchstone around which to build complementary monitoring devices
for firms. These findings strongly suggest that stock exchange criticisms,
although largely ignored in prior literature on China's securities markets,
have become an important tool for combating malfeasance in China's
securities markets.
In Part IV, we evaluate the use of shaming sanctions as a regulatory
tool in the Chinese context and tie the specific experience examined
here into a larger picture of corporate governance reform and legal de-
(concluding that "alternative . .. corporate governance mechanisms, such as those based
on reputation and relationships . . . support the growth of the Private Sector.").
13. See generally Alexander Dyck, Natalya Volchkova & Luigi Zingales, The
Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia (European Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 154/2007, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=891206 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Dyck et al., Russia]
(analyzing media coverage of Russian corporate governance from 1999-2002); Alexander
Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media (Ctr. for Research in
Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 543, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=335602
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Dyck & Zingales, Media] (discussing
manner in which media pressures corporate managers toward socially acceptable
practices).
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velopment in China. The use of shaming sanctions by the stock ex-
changes fits a larger (if uneven) pattern of experimentation and decen-
tralized enforcement that has taken root since China's economic and
legal reform period began in the late 1970s. Our research is consistent
with the general findings of other scholars who have emphasized the use
of relational or reputational mechanisms as informal supports for China's
economic development. Our study, however, provides a concrete and
contextualized example of how reputational mechanisms support eco-
nomic activity in capital markets. We also show that China's stock ex-
changes, despite their lack of independence from the state, may emerge
as important actors for strengthening oversight over China's listed com-
panies. Such controlled devolution of authority may be crucial to the
continued strengthening of legal institutions in China, just as it has
proved an important determinant of China's economic success to date.
I. CHINA'S STOCK MARKETS: REGULATORY AND
DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGIES
As noted above, there is now a large body of literature on stock mar-
ket development. 14 Generalizing from this literature, we find consensus
on several key points. Law matters to stock market development, al-
though we do not know under precisely what conditions or even precisely
what constitutes "good" law for this purpose. Moreover, private initiative
also matters, commonly in the form of self-regulation of members by the
stock exchanges, but perhaps also in the form of investor litigation.
In this Part, using these key points of consensus to frame the discus-
sion, we briefly describe the development of China's stock markets to
date. The picture that emerges is consistent with the general implica-
tions of the literature: a market that has grown significantly in a relatively
short time under a dual strategy of legal development and self-regulatory
initiative, 15 but one whose functions and linkages to the larger economy
are still problematic and shallow, plausibly due to the severe confines
within which the dual strategy has been pursued in the Chinese context.
Part A provides an overview of Chinese stock markets in comparative per-
spective. Part B outlines attempts to regulate these markets by statute
and investor-initiated litigation. Part C sketches the self-regulatory activi-
ties of the stock exchanges.
A. Two Snapshots of China's Stock Markets
China's present stock exchanges were formally approved and estab-
lished in late 1990. Their founding came just over a decade after the
process of economic liberalization began.' 6 This context is important in
14. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
15. Or at least what could reasonably pass as self-regulatory initiative under existing
political and legal constraints.
16. The Shanghai Stock Exchange was established on November 26, 1990, and the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange was established on December 1, 1990. See Shanghai Stock
934 [Vol. 108:929
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understanding why the exchanges were established. One major purpose
in creating the exchanges was to tap private savings to fund state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), which were in the process of being restructured. 17
SOE listings were viewed from a predominantly developmental perspec-
tive-financing local industry, raising fiscal revenues, and fueling the am-
bitions of local officials. 18 Another rationale was to stimulate investment
sentiment among the public. 19 Standard rationales for creating a stock
market-financing the most promising investment opportunities in the
economy and facilitating secondary trading of shares-appear to have
ranked relatively low among the government's list of priorities.
At their inception, the stock exchanges were founded as nonprofit
membership organizations. They were supervised by the two local gov-
ernments with some oversight by the local branches of the People's Bank
of China (PBOC), the central bank. The inconsistency of local regula-
tion and inadequacy of supervision, which generated some high-profile
problems, led to the creation of the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) and greater centralization of authority over the ex-
changes in 1992. For the next several years, authority was unevenly dis-
tributed among local officials and a variety of central government agen-
cies, including the CSRC, the PBOC, and the Ministry of Finance. It was
not until 1997 that oversight of the exchanges was centralized in the
CSRC.
Throughout the 1990s the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges com-
peted to attract new listings. 20 In September 2000, the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange suspended new listings in order to prepare for the creation of a
board of small and medium enterprises. Reports stated that Shanghai
and Shenzhen had competed for the right to host the new board, which
was to be focused on small, high-growth, and high-tech companies.
Exchange, Jiaoyisuo jieshao [Introduction to the Exchange], at http://www.sse.com.cn/
sseportal/ps/zhs/sjs/ysjs.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing history of Shanghai Stock Exchange); Shenzhen Stock Exchange,
Bensuo jianjie [Introduction to the Exchange], at http://www.szse.cn/main/aboutus/
bsjs/bsjj (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
history of Shenzhen Stock Exchange).
17. Kenneth W. Dam, The Law-Growth Nexus: The Rule of Law and Economic
Development 260 (2006).
18. Stephen Green, The Development of China's Stock Market, 1984-2002: Equity
Politics and Market Institutions 10-12 (2004).
19. Id. at 207.
20. Jinrong yanshengpin shichang tongyang xuyao jingzheng [The Market for
Financial Derivative Products Also Needs Competition], Jinrong shibao [Financial News],
Sept. 4, 2006, available at http://stock.jj.com.cn/news/2006-09-04/000001616420.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Wo Wei Yi Kuang, Shenzhen: ni bei shei paoqi?
[Shenzhen: Who Dumped You?], People's Daily Online, Nov. 17, 2002, at http://www.
people.com.cn/GB/32306/49291/5211136.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
posting ofJin Xinyi, Zhusanjiao shidiaojingzhengli le ma? [Has the Pearl River Delta Lost
Its Competitiveness?], to http://bbs.southcn.com/forum/index3.php?forumname=
lingnanchaguan&job=view&topicid=39797# (July 28, 2003, 15:42 EST) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
2008]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
Shenzhen prevailed, but only after giving up the right to list larger com-
panies.2 1 From late September 2000 through May 2004, virtually all new
A-share listings in China were on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.22
In May 2004, the CSRC, with approval of China's State Council, for-
mally approved the creation of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's Small and
Medium Enterprises Board (SMEB). New listings on the SMEB com-
menced in June 2004. As of February 2007, a total of 111 companies had
listed on the SMEB. In principle, since June 2004 all small and medium
companies have listed in Shenzhen, while larger companies have listed in
Shanghai. 23 Although there do not appear to be fixed thresholds distin-
21. See Huang He, Chuangyeban, xiayibu [Start-up Board, the Next Step], Nanfang
zhoumo [Southern Daily], June 1, 2006, available at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/
ZM/20060601/Mj/cj/200606010043.asp (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Zhong Lu,
Chuangyeban hechu chu:.ngye? Jinghushen zhankai zheng "ban" dazhan [Where Will the
Start-Up Board Be Started? Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen Begin the Battle for
Obtaining the "Board"], Beijing qingnian bao [Beijing Youth Daily], Nov. 18, 2000,
available at http://www.bjyouth.com.cn/Bqb/20001018/GB/4405AD1018B1707.htm (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). Shenzhen also successfully resisted efforts to merge the
two exchanges. Chen Hong, 1999 Yimao zhibian shenhu zhizheng (2) [A Heightened
Battle Between the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in 1999 (2)], at http://www.
ynlib.cn/whpd/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=25497 (last modified June 14, 2006) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review);Jiaoyisuo congjunheng fazhan zou xiangjingzheng [Stock
Exchanges Go From Balanced Development to Competition], at http://www.shlottery.gov.
cn/epublish/gb/paperl24/20001222/classO12400011/hwz174787.htm (last visited Jan.
30, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
22. In September 2000, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange suspended the listing of new A-
shares in order to prepare for the establishment of the start-up board. See Duan Hongyan,
Diwei xueruo, gongneng ruohua, zanting Shenjiaosuo xinggu shangshi dui Shenzhen
zhengquan shichang yingxiang yanjiu [Position to Be Weakened, Functions to Be
Reduced: Research Concerning the Impact on the Shenzhen Securities Market Caused by
the Suspension of the Listing of New Shares on the Shenzhen Exchange], Zhongguo
jingying bao [China Management Newspaper], Aug. 29, 2002, available at http://www.
people.com.cn/GB/jinji/36/20020829/810945.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). Such suspension did not end until May 2004, after the CSRC formally approved
the creation of the Shenzhen Exchange's Small and Medium Enterprises Board. See
Zhongxiao qiye bankuai fazhan licheng [Timeline of the Development of the Small and
Medium Enterprise Board], Sichuan xinwen wang-Chengdu shangbao [Sichuan News
Web-Chengdu Business Newspaper], June 25, 2004, available at http://finance.sina.com.
cn/roll/20040625/0624833315.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
23. Shenjiaosuo wuyue tuichu zhong xiao qiyeban yu Shenzhen zhuban shichang
baochijuli [The Small and Medium Enterprises Board That the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
Will Launch in May Will Maintain Separation from the Main Board], Zhonghua
gongshang shibao [China Business Times], Mar. 30, 2004, available at http://business.
sohu.com/2004/03/30/73/article219657350.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
A 2006 report in the China Securities Journal stated that the standard for determining
companies to be listed on the SMEB "is still awaiting clarification," and that the size of
companies listing on the SMEB has been gradually increasing. Zhou Dao, Zhonggong
guoji shoufa guimo chuang zhongxiaoban gongsijilu [The Size of CAMC's Initial Offering
Is a Record for the Small and Medium Enterprises Board], Zhongguo zhengquan bao
[China Securities Journal], May 30, 2006, available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/
20060530/0539717153.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Some new listings in
Shenzhen post-2004 have exceeded the size of certain listings in Shanghai during the same
936 [Vol. 108:929
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guishing the size of listings on the two exchanges, in general Shanghai-
listed companies tend to be larger, more prominent, and have more con-
nections to state ownership than those listed in Shenzhen. As ofJanuary
2008, there were a total of 690 companies listed in Shenzhen and 840
listed in Shanghai. 24
Today, Chinese stock markets look extremely impressive, particularly
given their short history. A snapshot of their current size-as measured
by several widely used metrics-is provided in Table 1.
TABLE 1: WORLD RANKINGS OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION, VALUE TRADED,
AND NUMBER OF LISTED DOMESTIC COMPANIES, 2006
Number of
Total Market Total Value Listed
Capitalization Traded Domestic
Rank Market (US$ millions) Rank Market (US$ millions) Rank Market Companies
I United States 19,425,855 1 United States 33,267,643 1 United States 5,433
2 Japan 4,726,269 2 Japan 6,252,470 2 India 4,796
3 United Kingdom 3,794,310 3 United Kingdom 4,242,082 3 Canada 3,790
4 France 2,428,572 4 France 2,504,704 4 Japan 3,362
5 China 2,426,326 5 Germany 2,486,668 5 Spain 3,339
6 Spain 1,930,620 6 United Kingdom 2,913
7 China 1,635,121 7 Romania 2,478
8 Australia 1,751
9 Korea 1,694
10 China 1,440
Source: S&P Global Stock Market Factbook (2007)
As Table 1 indicates, by the end of 2006 China's stock markets were
the fifth largest in the world as measured by market capitalization; sev-
enth largest by total value traded (a more accurate measure of their true
size, given that most shares of public companies in China are only now
becoming tradable as a result of reforms undertaken in 2005 and 2006);
and tenth largest by number of listed companies. Table 1 thus lends sup-
port to the conclusion of other observers that China has done well in
comparison to other transition economies in terms of stock market devel-
opment, at least as measured by these standard indicators. 25 Nonethe-
less, the market is still not commensurate with China's huge size along
period. The general trend, however, is for smaller companies to list in Shenzhen and for
larger companies to list in Shanghai.
24. For a current list of the companies listed in the Shenzhen Exchange, see
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Shangshi gongsi liebiao [Table of Listed Companies], at http:/
/www.szse.cn/main/marketdata/jypz/colist/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2008) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). For a current list of the companies listed on the Shanghai
Exchange, see Shangshi gongsi [Listed Companies], at http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/
webapp/datapresent/SSEQueryStocknfoAct?reportName=BizCompStocknfoRpt&
PRODUCTID=&PRODUCTJP=&PRODUCTNAME=&keyword=&tab-flg=&CURSOR=51
(last visitedJan. 30, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Note that the number of
Shanghai listed companies is A-Share listed companies only.
25. See Pistor & Xu, supra note 7, at 185 ("Standard measures for stock market
performances suggest that China is performing better than most other transition
economies .... ).
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many other economic dimensions such as foreign reserves, trade surplus,
private savings, and so on.
But these data may convey a rather misleading picture of the market.
The companies listed on the Chinese stock exchanges are small relative
to listed firms in other markets, even in other transition economies such
as Mexico and Brazil. For example, China ranks thirty-second in the
world in terms of the average size of listed companies. 2 6 Moreover, the
state or state affiliates control about 60% of the companies listed on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, despite the fact that much of
the tremendous growth in the economy has been generated in the pri-
vate sector, not the state sector.
By other measures, China's stock market appears considerably more
marginal. For example, the percentage of external capital to GNP is 16%
in China (using only the value traded part of the stock market rather
than total market capitalization) versus 40% in a widely used ("LLSV")
average. As of 2005, bank deposits were about eighteen times larger than
stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP. 27 The ratio of IPOs
to population is 0.05 in China versus 1.02 in the LLSV average. As one
group of researchers concludes, "Both the scale and relative importance
(compared with other channels of financing) of China's external markets
are not significant."28 To be sure, the market is gaining in importance as
a mechanism of corporate finance and a means to channel China's huge
private savings. But these developments are very recent; their sus-
tainability has yet to be proven.
China's stock market suffers from serious problems that limit its role
in the economy. For example, listed companies in China exhibit low vari-
ation (high synchronicity) in firm-specific stock returns, 29 suggesting that
the stock market does not allocate capital efficiently. Consequently, re-
searchers conclude, "Russia and China, among all transition economies
with substantial stock markets, have been least successful at fostering
functionally efficient stock markets." 30 The Chinese stock market is also
26. It is worth noting that, as Table 1 indicates, China has far fewer listed companies
(1440) than the major developed economies such as the U.S. (5433), or other large
transition economies today, such as India (4796).
27. Price Waterhouse Coopers, Investment Management Perspectives 15 (July 2005),
available at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/industry.nsf/docid/1 282bde3dace909985256f87
0075d832/$File/julyO5perspectives.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
28. Allen et al., Economic Growth, supra note 12, at 73.
29. See Art Durnev, Kan Li, Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Capital Markets and
Capital Allocation: Implications for Economies in Transition, 12 Econ. Transition 593,
595-96 (2004) (comparing U.S., "a more functionally efficient stock market," with China,
"a more functionally inefficient" market where "functional efficiency" refers to ability of
stock market to allocate capital to its highest value uses); see also Merritt B. Fox, Art
Durnev, Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic
Performance: The New Evidence 29 fig.3 (Aug. 19, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (showing, from study of forty countries, China with
second lowest level of share price accuracy).
30. See Durnev et al., supra note 29, at 623.
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TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF EXTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS (MEAN)
English French German Scandinavian LLSV
origin Origin origin origin origin China
Country average average average average average (2002)
External 0.60 0.21 0.46 0.30 0.40 0.49
capital/GNP (0.16)*
Domestic firms/
Pop 35.45 10.00 16.79 27.26 21.59 0.93
IPOs/Population 2.23 0.19 0.12 2.14 1.02 0.05
Total debt/GNP 0.68 0.45 0.97 0.57 0.59 0.35
(0.79)**
Source: Adapted from Allen et al. (2005)
* External capital/GNP ratio using the floating supply or value traded portion of the market
capitalization.
**Total debt/GNP ratio using bank loans issued to all sectors including the state sector.
believed to be inefficient in pricing capital.3 1 In its short history, the Chi-
nese stock market has been beset by scandals. During the period from
1999 to 2003-a time of sharp market decline-there was widespread
false accounting, misleading disclosure among listed firms, and several
major scandals involving some of the largest listed companies in China.
Accounting fraud, market manipulation, and poor disclosure were seen
as widespread in the early years of the market and remain problematic
today.3 2
For most of the stock market's short history until very recently, these
problems worked to limit the number of investors in the market along
with the importance of the stock market in China's experiment with capi-
talism. As one observer put it several years ago, "In economic terms, the
impact of China's stock market on the real economy and society as a
whole has been marginal . . . ,,13 Although the market boomed in
2006-2007 and drew in many new investors, the recent trend appears un-
related to a surge in investor confidence in the structure of the market.
In short, China's "newly established Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE)
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) ... are growing in size and vol-
ume, but their scale and importance are still not comparable to other
channels of financing, in particular the banking sector."34
Thus, China's stock market development to date presents a decid-
edly mixed picture-it is a large market, but one that does not yet play a
meaningful role in pricing and allocating capital in the Chinese econ-
omy, particularly for firms unconnected to the state. In the next sections,
31. See Dongwei Su, Chinese Stock Markets: A Research Handbook 88 (2003)
(suggesting inefficiency from variance ratio tests of Chinese market).
32. See, e.g., Zhiwu Chen, Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China Case,
14 China Econ. Rev. 451, 459 (2003) (noting widely known accounting fraud and market
abuses).
33. Id. at 453.
34. Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Comparing China's Financial System
5-6 (Sept. 30, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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we will see that this mixed picture is precisely the result to be expected
based on China's uneven pursuit of the legal approach and the self-regu-
latory approach.
B. The Legal Approach
Given the developmental rationale for the establishment of the ex-
changes, it is not surprising that investor protection did not receive much
attention in the early years of China's stock market. Almost a decade of
operation by the stock exchanges passed before the legal system began to
respond in a comprehensive way to investor protection concerns. A se-
curities law was enacted in 1998.35 The law gave the CSRC clear regula-
tory authority over the stock exchanges.3 6 It expressly prohibited disclo-
sure of false information, insider trading, and market manipulation, but
did not in practice permit investor lawsuits.3 7 This new legal environ-
ment was stress tested shortly after it was put in place, when a serious
market decline in 2001 brought numerous lawsuits against listed compa-
nies. Initially, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) instructed lower courts
not to hear the suits, no doubt reflecting concerns about institutional
competency.38 In January 2002, however, the SPC issued a guideline pro-
viding that investor suits for misleading disclosure could be brought, pro-
vided the company had been administratively sanctioned for false disclo-
35. Prior to 1998, the securities market had been governed by a series of regulations.
One of the most significant is the Administrative Provisional Regulations on the Issuance
and Trading of Securities. See Liu Zhenxian, "Zhengquan fa" licheng: Guowuyuan liudao
jinpai goucheng jinri fengjing [Development Process of the Securities Law: Six Gold
Medals from the State Council Created Today's Landscape], Xinhuanet.com, Apr. 19,
2005, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-04/19/content-2848072.htm (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
36. The 2005 Securities Law continues this authority, stating that the CSRC is to "carry
out supervision and administration of the securities market" and is responsible for
investigating and punishing any violations of the securities laws. Zhengquan fa [Securities
Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective
Jan. 1, 2006), arts. 178-179, translated in LawInfoChina (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter 2005 Securities Law].
37. Whether the 1998 law authorized civil lawsuits is a topic that has generated
disagreement. Article 63 of the 1998 law stated that individuals and companies who
committed misrepresentation should pay for any resulting harms-strongly suggesting that
litigation could be used. In practice, however, courts did not view this provision as
authorizing civil lawsuits. Chinese scholars have argued that the courts, in refusing to
accept such suits, were ignoring the law. Zhengquan fa [Securities Law] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 1, 1999), art. 63,
translated in LawlnfoChina (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 1998
Securities Law].
38. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu she zhengquan minshi peichang anjian zan buyu
shouli de tongzhi [Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Refusing to Accept Civil
Compensation Cases Involving Securities for the Time Being] (promulgated by Sup.
People's Ct., Sept. 21, 2001, effective Sept. 21, 2001) (P.R.C), available at http://www.law-
lib.com/law/lawviewl.asp?id=16373 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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sure by the CSRC.3 9 A subsequent SPC regulation in 2003 also permitted
suits in cases where the company had been punished for false or mislead-
ing disclosure by other administrative departments or found liable in a
criminal proceeding. 40 The 2003 regulation also authorized suits where
individual company officials, but not the company, had been administra-
tively sanctioned or convicted of a crime.
4
'
The CSRC uses three primary tools to punish listed companies. First,
for lesser infractions, the CSRC may issue reprimands called "correction
orders," in which a company or individual is told to correct certain behav-
ior.42 Crucially, however, correction orders are not formal administrative
sanctions and thus do not make target companies eligible for civil lawsuits
under the SPC ruling discussed above. Second, the CSRC issues more
serious administrative sanctions that may take the form of formal warn-
ings or fines.43 Fines for companies range from 300,000 to 600,000 yuan
(approximately $42,000-$85,000); individuals are subject to fines ranging
from 30,000 to 300,000 yuan ($4,200-$42,000).44 As discussed above,
companies subject to administrative sanctions relating to information dis-
closure are also subject to potential civil liability as provided in the 2002
SPC Guideline and the 2003 SPC Regulation. Third, individuals who
commit serious violations may also be barred from participation in the
securities markets and from serving as a senior manager or director of a
listed company. 45
39. For the full text of the 2002 SPC Guideline, see Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu
shouli zhengquan shichang yin xujia chenshu yingfa de minshi qinquan jiufen anjian
youguan wenti de tongzhi [Supreme People's Court's Notice Regarding Accepting Tort
Cases Arising from Stock Market False Disclosure] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct.,
Jan. 15, 2002, effective Jan. 15, 2002), art. 2, translated in LawInfoChina (last visited Feb.
20, 2002) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2002 SPC Guideline].
40. For the full text of the 2003 SPC Regulation, see Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu
shenli zhengquan shichang yin xujia chenshu yingfa de minshi peichang anjian de ruogan
guiding [Several Regulations of the Supreme People's Court Regarding Trying Civil
Compensation Cases Arising from Stock Market False Disclosure] (promulgated by the
Sup. People's Ct., Jan. 9, 2003, effective Jan. 9, 2003) (P.R.C), available at http://www.
court.gov.cn/lawdata/explain/civil/200312220011.htm. (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter 2003 SPC Regulation]. In particular, see articles 5 and 6 which
regulate the imputation of liability and joint liability, respectively.
41. Id. arts. 5, 7 (regulating imputation of liability and calculation of damages,
respectively). The 2002 SPC Guideline was silent on this issue. In practice, the CSRC
rarely disciplines corporate officials for misrepresentations without also sanctioning the
company.
42. The CSRC technically may also issue reprimands referred to as "notices of
criticism" (tongbao piping). It does so only rarely, and such notices do not appear to be a
key regulatory tool of the CSRC.
43. In most cases companies or individuals are both fined and warned; in a small
number of cases the CSRC has imposed either only a warning or only a fine.
44. 2005 Securities Law, supra note 36, art. 193.
45. Id. art. 233. Further details regarding individuals subject to bans are set forth in
the Zhengquan shichang jinru guiding [Provisions on Banning the Entry into the
Securities Market] (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, June 7, 2006,
effective July 10, 2006), translated in LawinfoChina (last visited Feb. 1, 2008) (P.R.C.)
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TABLE 3: CSRC SANCTIONS, 2001-200646
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total Number of Sanction
Decisions 29 17 35 49 43 37
Sanctions Directed Against
Entities or Entities and Indi-
viduals 24 13 33 39 38 28
Sanctions Directed Against
Individuals Only 5 4 2 10 5 9
Total Number of Companies
Sanctioned 24 13 33 39 38 28
Listed Companies 8 5 17 26 14 22
Securities Entities (Includes
Securities Companies and
Subsidiary Organizations) 9 3 7 3 20 4
Law Firms 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accounting Firms 4 4 4 4 2 1
Asset Appraisal Firms 0 0 0 1 0 0
Other Types of Companies 3 1 5 5 2 1
Total Number of Individuals
Sanctioned 115 70 147 283 154 153
Company Directors 79 53 130 241 117 111
Company Non-Director
Employees* 1 3 4 7 10 10
Company Supervisors 0 0 0 1 0 0
Securities Industry
Employees 16 4 4 20 20 23
Certified Public Accountants 16 9 9 12 7 2
Lawyers 0 1 0 0 0 0
Certified Public Valuers 0 0 0 2 0 0
Others 3 0 0 0 0 7
Cases Involving Information
Disclosure 8 6** 17 27** 15"* 24**
*Typically a chief accountant or financial supervisor.
**One case included in the total is a sanction against an individual only, not the company.
Table 3 shows the number of formal administrative sanctions issued
by the CSRC from 2001-2006. Several points are noteworthy. First, from
one perspective, the number of sanctions seems rather modest given the
ubiquity and severity of the problems with false accounting, insider trad-
ing, and inaccurate disclosure in China's stock markets. The institutional
and political constraints within which the CSRC operates seem apparent
in these rather small numbers. On the other hand, this regulatory activity
[hereinafter Provisions on Banning Entry]. Market bans are not technically considered to
be administrative sanctions. In practice, however, individuals who are banned are also
subject to administrative sanctions.
46. Source: China Securities Regulatory Commission, at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n57
5458/n575742/n576221/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2008) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). One case from 2001 appears to be missing from the website and thus is not
included in the table. Note that there may be some discrepancies between our numbers
here and those currently available on the website primarily because not all cases are posted
to the websites at all times. Our data reflects the data available as of year end 2006.
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must be viewed within the developing country context and considered in
light of the youth of the institutions involved. Second, the last row of the
table, showing the number of sanctions for misleading disclosure, is the
number of companies that are eligible to be sued by investors under the
SPC's 2002 and 2003 guidelines.
The difficulties of the legal approach are highlighted by our data. As
can be seen from the last row of the table, during the five year period,
ninety-seven companies were "suit-eligible" under the criteria specified in
the SPC guideline. An additional twelve companies were suit-eligible be-
cause they were sanctioned in 2000, and thus came within the two year
statute of limitations that the SPC established when it first authorized
such suits in 2002. Thus a total of 109 companies have been suit-eligible
as a result of CSRC administrative sanctions. Some additional companies
sanctioned by the Ministry of Finance or held criminally liable in this
period were also suit-eligible. Complete data on these sanctions are un-
available, but Chinese lawyers who have represented plaintiffs in investor
fraud suits estimate that approximately twenty additional listed compa-
nies are suit-eligible as a result of criminal judgments or Ministry of
Finance sanctions.47 Thus, the total number of suit-eligible companies
appears to be approximately 130. According to our analysis and to plain-
tiffs' lawyers, roughly twenty companies have in fact been sued in this
period.48 A sue rate of about 15% may initially strike some readers as
high, but recall that in order to be suit-eligible, a company must have
already been administratively or criminally sanctioned for misleading dis-
closure. Because the factual finding of wrongdoing has already been
made, in theory recovery should be straightforward: Plaintiffs must show
that they were harmed by the fraud, which is determined on the basis of
whether plaintiffs held shares at a certain point. Thus, put differently,
although CSRC-sanctioned companies would appear to be easy targets for
investor lawsuits, approximately 85% of the eligible target companies
have not been sued.
Interviews with plaintiffs' attorneys and judges suggest that many
suit-eligible firms have not been sued because the prospect of recovery is
simply too small to justify the expense, time, and effort required to bring
suit.49 Doctrinal obstacles and uncertainties, the lack of a class action
mechanism to aggregate claims, local favoritism in the courts, uncertain
enforcement prospects, political pressure, and a lack of assets against
which to collect a judgment from an erstwhile defendant corporation all
work to diminish the viability of the legal system as a means of protecting
47. Interview 2006-61.
48. There is no comprehensive source of data on cases filed. Data on the number of
companies sued is based primarily on review of Chinese media reports: We searched the
media for reports of any cases of investor lawsuits during the period under study. Our
estimate has been confirmed by conversations with both plaintiffs' lawyers and Supreme
People's Court officials. Id.
49. Interview 2006-70.
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investors. Only a handful of cases thus far have resulted in ajudgment in
favor of plaintiffs; a small number have also settled.50 Comprehensive
data on such outcomes are not available. One 2006 media report stated
that fourteen cases had resulted in judgments or settlements; lawyers say
that only a few cases have resulted in court judgments ordering compen-
sation to plaintiffs. 51 Many of these judgments and settlements have yet
to be enforced, and other cases are languishing in the courts without any
apparent progress toward a judgment.
China's use of the legal approach is not limited to use of sanctions
against offenders. Over the past decade, the CSRC has worked to con-
struct a system of ex ante regulations-for example, by imposing limita-
tions on transactions that are not arms-length 52 or by requiring informa-
tion disclosure.5 3 There has also been lively debate in the Chinese
50. Id.
51. See Lu Zhou, Shouli kuaiji shiwusuo bei panfa [The FirstJudgment Penalizing an
Accounting Firm], Beijing qingnian bao [Beijing Youth Daily], Aug. 3, 2006, available at
http://www.p5w.net/news/gncj/200608/t451328.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
52. The CSRC issued such limitations through a number of opinions and notices. In
general terms, the CSRC prohibits non-arms-length transactions between related parties
that will damage the interests of listed companies. In addition, those who damage the
interests of listed companies through such transactions may be subject to liability. For full
texts of the relevant CSRC opinions and notices, see Guowuyuan pizhun Zhengjianhui
guanyu tigao shangshi gongsi zhiliang yijian de tongzhi [Notice of the State Council
Regarding the Approval and Dissemination of the Suggestions of the CSRC on the
Improvement of the Quality of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the St. Council, Oct.
19, 2005, effective Oct. 19, 2005) (P.R.C.), at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-11/O1/
content_88761.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Guanyu shangshi gongsi
shenru xuexi "xing fa xiuzhen an (liu)" youguan shiyi de tongzhi [Notice Regarding the
Intensive Study by Listed Companies of "Amendment of the Criminal Law (6)"]
(promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n,July 12, 2006, effective July 12, 2006)
(P.R.C.), at http://www.chinaacc.com/new/63%2F69%2FI12%2F2006%2F7%2Fzh8l33
8821171760024208-O.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Guanyu fabu shangshi
gongsi guquan fenzhi gaige guanli banfa de tongzhi [Notice Regarding the Release of the
"Listed Companies Share Allocation Reform Management Procedures"] (promulgated by
the China Sec. Regulatory Com'n, Sept. 4, 2005, effective Sept. 5, 2005) (P.R.C.), at http:/
/www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/flgz/regulations/listedco/listed2005O9O5.htm (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
53. Cf. Benjamin Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese
Legal System, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 31 n.119 (2005) [hereinafter Liebman, Watchdog or
Demagogue] (discussing how media promotes corporate information disclosure). The
CSRC has issued a number of regulations requiring listed companies to disclose
information. For example, in January 2007, the CSRC promulgated Administrative
Measures Concerning the Information Disclosure of Listed Companies, pursuant to which
listed companies must disclose annual, interim, and quarterly reports. Listed companies
must also make disclosure immediately after the occurrence of significant events that
might affect the trading prices of their securities. For the full text of the Measures, see
Shangshi gongsi xinxi pilu guanli banfa [Administrative Measures Concerning the
Information Disclosure of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory
Comm'n,Jan. 30, 2007, effectiveJan. 30, 2007) (P.R.C.), at http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/
2007-02/13/content_525673.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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financial media regarding a range of options for strengthening the legal
approach. Yet there appears to be widespread agreement that, at least as
of yet, the legal approach has failed to address the widespread problems
in China's capital markets.
These problems with the legal approach to investor protection may
account for the fact that China's stock market is still relatively underde-
veloped and insignificant to the economy as a whole. Research by
Franklin Allen and coauthors supports this conclusion. Comparing
China's investor protections and external financial market development
to those of forty-nine other countries, they find that China appears in the
bottom left corner of the matrix (weak investor protections and compara-
tively small capital market) together with Mexico and Indonesia. 54 Hong
Kong and Singapore appear in the extreme upper right hand corner
(strong investor protections and comparatively large capital markets),
with the United Kingdom and the United States in the same region. 5 5
C. The Stock Exchanges as Self-Regulatory Organizations
As noted in the Introduction, the legal approach to capital market
development does not appear to be the only successful approach, either
as a historical matter or from a theoretical perspective. Stock exchanges
may be well placed-perhaps even optimally situated-to provide inves-
tor protections. The literature on stock exchanges as regulators, how-
ever, rests on the assumption that the exchanges are private, member-run
organizations, an assumption that does not hold for China. As noted
above, although the Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges were initially or-
ganized as member organizations overseen by their respective local gov-
ernments, since 1997 they have been under the direct oversight of the
CSRC. 56 The first securities law defined the exchanges as legal entities
without profit motive established by China's State Council for the pur-
pose of trading in securities. 5 7 This regulatory restructuring had impor-
tant effects on the self-regulatory authority of the exchanges. The CSRC,
not the exchanges, has the power to appoint and remove major stock
exchange personnel, including the general manager.5 8 Until 2006, the
CSRC approved the listing of securities on the exchanges, and effectively
retained exclusive authority to delist firms. 59 Although the exchanges
54. See Allen et al., Economic Growth., supra note 12, at 75.
55. Id.
56. See supra Part I.A.
57. 1998 Securities Law, supra note 37, art. 95.
58. See Zhengquan jiaoyisuo guanli banfa [Measures for the Administration of
Securities Exchanges] (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, Dec. 12, 2001,
effective Dec. 12, 2001), arts. 6, 7, 8, 29, translated in LawlnfoChina (last visited Feb. 23,
2008) (P.R.C.) (prescribing CSRC powers); 2005 Securities Law, supra note 36, art. 107
(stating that general manager of stock exchange shall be subject to appointment and
dismissal by state regulatory authority).
59. 1998 Securities Law, supra note 37, arts. 55-56. Article 57 of the 1998 Securities
Law stated that the CSRC could delegate such power to the exchanges. Id. art. 57.
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were legally charged with supervising information disclosure by listed
firms, they lacked formal investigative and sanctioning power. As one
commentator observed, the paramount influence of "the CSRC's in-
terventionist role in securities regulation overshadows [China's] stock ex-
changes' ability to practice their self-regulatory role as mandated by the
Securities Law."6
0
In theory, the 2005 revision of the securities law moved the ex-
changes a step closer to actually performing a self-regulatory role. Two
changes are significant. First, the law gives the exchanges the power to
accept listings, temporarily suspend trading in securities, 61 and delist
companies. 62 Second, the law now expressly defines China's stock ex-
changes as self-regulatory organizations. 63 Commentators and exchange
officials have pointed to the change as signifying that the exchanges are
no longer state entities, and that the exchanges are moving toward
greater autonomy from the CSRC.64 In practice, however, the exchanges
60. Chenxia Shi, Protecting Investors in China Through Multiple Regulatory
Mechanisms and Effective Enforcement, 24 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 451, 471 (2007).
61. 2005 Securities Law, supra note 36, art. 55.
62. Id. art. 56. The new law also permits the exchange to establish listings
requirements that are higher than those set by the 1998 Securities Law. In addition to
specifying certain conditions under which trading may be suspended or a company may be
delisted, the 2005 Securities Law also states that the exchange may specify in its listing rules
other situations in which a company may be delisted or have trading suspended. Article 60
of the 2005 Securities Law gives the exchanges the power, under certain circumstances, to
temporarily suspend trading in bonds, and article 61 grants the exchanges similar power to
delist companies' bonds. Id. arts. 60-61. The provisions, however, do not grant discretion
to the exchanges to specify additional conditions leading to suspension of trading in
bonds. This may reflect the fact that China's bond market is fragmented, with only some
forms of bonds being traded on the stock exchanges.
63. Id. art. 102. The revised securities law also states that administrative review of
decisions to suspend trading or to delist companies shall be handled by a body established
by the exchanges. Thus under article 62 of the new law, stock exchange decisions to delist
or suspend trading in shares or bonds are not subject to review by the CSRC. Id. art. 62.
Prior to the new law, administrative review of decisions to suspend or delist shares was
handled by the CSRC. Zhongguo Zhengquan jiandu guanli weiyuanhui xingzheng fuyi
banfa [Measures of China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n for the Admin. Reconsideration]
(promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, Nov. 25, 2002, effectiveJan. 1, 2003),
art. 4, translated in LawlnfoChina (last visited Feb. 1, 2008) (P.R.C.). A third potentially
significant change is the omission of a reference to the exchanges as "non-profit." Thus, in
theory, exchanges could be restructured into for-profit organizations.
64. See, e.g., Fang Yuan, Quanli xiafang zhihou: jiaoyisuo zhimian "sanchongmen"
[After the Delegation of Authority: the Exchange Faces Three Gates], 21 Shiji jingji bao
[21st Century Economic Reports], Nov. 2, 2005, available at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.
cn/jj/20051103/cj/200511020056.asp (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Hubei Stock
Depository Ctr., Xin "Zhengquan fa" wanshan zhengquan shichangjianguan zhidu de fali
jiedu [Jurisprudential Explanations of the Improvement of the Oversight System of the
Securities Market from the New "Securities Law"], available at http://www.hbgufen.com/
nhbgufen/hbgqtgzx/ArticleShow.asp?ArticleID=1799 (last modified Jan. 9, 2006) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review); Xu Jian, Wanquan jiedu "Zhengquan fa" xiuding an [A
Complete Explanation of the Revision of the "Securities Law"], Diyi caijin ribao (Number
One Finance and Economics Daily], Oct. 28, 2005, available at http://dycj.ynet.com/
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continue to be subject to the authority and control of the CSRC, with
senior officials at both exchanges appointed by the CSRC.6 5
Although the self-regulatory capacity of the two exchanges is a work
in progress, they have been proactive in carving out a role for themselves
within the narrow political and institutional space provided them by the
state. Perhaps not surprisingly, few observers have paid close attention to
these efforts, focusing instead on the much higher profile legal approach
pursued by the CSRC and private litigants. 6 6 But as we will see, in over-
looking the enforcement role of the exchanges, observers have missed a
novel and potentially important experiment in capital market regulation
through reputational sanctions. We turn now to an exploration of this
experiment.
II. PUBLIC CRITICISMS BY THE STOCK EXCHANGES
In this Part, we examine public criticisms by the stock exchanges as a
regulatory tool in China. In Part A, we provide comprehensive data on
the number of companies and individuals criticized by the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2001 to 2006. In Part B, we query
whether these criticisms represent a delegation of regulatory authority
from the CSRC to the stock exchanges. In Part C, we analyze whether the
data reflect a nascent form of regulatory competition between the
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
The stock exchanges have four primary regulatory tools at their dis-
posal. In ascending order of severity, they are oral warnings, letters of
oversight and supervision, notices of criticisms, and the focus of this
Essay-public criticisms. 67 In addition, the stock exchanges may deem
article.jsp?oid=6665318 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Zhang Hanqing,
"Zhengquan fa" xiugai jiang gei shichang dailai xin lihao ["Securities Law" Revision Will
Bring New Advantages to the Market], Xinhuanet.com, Oct. 29, 2005, at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-10/29/content_3698917.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
65. Zhang Weijing & Xiao Huadong, Xin zhengquan fa chutai zhihou [After the New
Securities Law Comes Out], Liaowang dongfang zhoukan [Eastern Outlook Weekly], Nov.
11, 2005, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-11-09/10098250523.shtml (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on arguments that law makes no substantive
changes to division of authority between CSRC and exchanges, in significant part because
CSRC continues to select exchanges' senior officials); see also Interview 2006-1; Interview
2006-69.
66. Interestingly, the most extensive treatment of the public criticisms in the English-
language literature treats them as indistinguishable from CSRC (government) sanctions,
rather than as a self-regulatory initiative of the exchanges. See Chen et al., Toothless
Tiger, supra note 9, at 459 (listing public criticism along with CSRC penalties as types of
punishments for violations of securities law).
67. We translate the Chinese term for the sanctions, gongkai qianze, as "public
criticism." Other writers in English have translated the term as either "public censure" or
.public condemnation." Although "public censure" is perhaps a more literal translation of
the Chinese, we use "public criticism" because it more effectively conveys the intended
reputational effects of such sanctions. The exchanges only started issuing public criticisms
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individuals to be unsuitable to serve as senior managers or directors of
listed companies; the exchanges may also order companies to remove
their secretaries. 68 Only public criticisms and declarations of unsuitabil-
ity for office or orders to remove secretaries are made public; the less
severe sanctions are considered to be nonpublic "internal oversight
measures."
69
The use of public criticisms as a regulatory device by the Chinese
exchanges is an example of extended institutional borrowing. The prac-
tice of publicly censuring listed firms and directors originated in the
London Stock Exchange. It was extended in the Financial Services and
Markets Act, under which the Financial Services Authority (FSA) may
publicly censure any director knowingly involved in a breach of the stock
exchange listing rules. The censure provisions supplement more formal
penalties that may be imposed for violation of the listing rules and
Companies Act. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange borrowed the practice
of issuing public criticisms from the London Stock Exchange. The two
Chinese stock exchanges, in turn, modeled their practice on Hong
Kong.70 The effect of public criticisms, as regulatory devices in London
and Hong Kong has not been systematically examined. Some scholars,
in 1999. Wu Zhipan, Zhengquan jiaoyisuo chuliquan wend yanjiu 33 [Research into
Questions Regarding the Sanction Powers of Stock Exchanges], Shenzhen Stock
Exchange, Apr. 28, 2005, available at http://www.szse.cn/UpFiles/Attach/1903/2005/04/
28/1405348750.doc (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that since beginning of
"public criticism" in 1999, almost 100 listed companies have been criticized for irregular
information disclosure).
68. Warnings are generally issued for only minor infractions. Oversight letters are
slightly more serious, but are still relatively minor notices to companies that appear
primarily designed to elicit further information from companies regarding unusual
arrangements or activities. Notices of criticism are more serious, and are one step short of
a public criticism. Of these lesser forms of oversight measures, letters of oversight are by
far the most common: The Shanghai Stock Exchange issued 716 such letters in 2006,
although in prior years the highest total number of such letters was 153. The number of
oral warnings and nonpublic notices of criticism issued by each of the two exchanges has
generally been a few dozen per year. Interview 2006-99.
69. Notices of criticism, or tongbao piping, the second most serious step the exchanges
take against listed companies, are generally not made public. In some cases, however, the
exchanges have made such notices public, or companies have disclosed the fact that they
have received notices of criticism. News reports also from time-to-time carry details of such
nonpublic sanctions. Interview 2006-77.
In addition, although notices of criticism from the Shanghai Stock Exchange are
distributed only to the company or individuals being criticized, the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange distributes notices of criticism to all listed companies. Interview 2006-69. The
rationale for informing other companies appears to be that doing so will help the overall
functioning of the market by informing all companies of the types of conduct that are
being punished. Exchange officials defend the practice of notifying other companies but
not the public on the grounds that they are a self-regulatory organization, and are simply
making other members of the exchange aware of the misconduct. They also contend that
such conduct is not generally so serious as to be of interest to investors. Interview 2007-4.
70. We are grateful to legal practitioners and academics in Hong Kong who made us
aware of the provenance of the stock exchange criticisms in China.
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however, have argued that the use of criticisms by the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange has contributed to comparatively low levels of private benefits
of control among Hong Kong-listed firms. 7 1
Although the listing rules of both exchanges make clear that viola-
tions may subject companies to internal or public sanctions, the conduct
that will result in each type of sanction is not made public. The listing
rules, which were first adopted in 1998 and revised repeatedly thereaf-
ter, 7 2 contain only vague language regarding the circumstances in which
the exchanges may issue public or internal sanctions against listed com-
panies. In general, the listing rules state that the exchanges may issue
nonpublic or public sanctions against listed companies depending on
whether the offending conduct is minor or serious. 7 3 Similarly, the list-
ing rules state that the exchanges may deem an individual unfit to serve
as a director, supervisor, or senior manager of a listed company, but pro-
vide no details as to the conduct that will result in such a
determination.7 4
The lack of detail in the listing rules leaves extensive discretion in
the hands of the exchanges in determining whether companies should be
subject to public criticisms or other measures. The Shenzhen Exchange
71. See, e.g., Dyck & Zingales, Media, supra note 13, at 12-13 (finding that average
size of private benefits is far lower for Hong Kong than international average); Alexander
Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison 16,
47-59 (Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 535, 2001), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractIid=296107 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (providing empirical evidence that Hong Kong is among fourteen countries where
private benefits are low-three percent of value of equity or less).
72. The Shanghai and Shenzhen Listing Rules were identical in their substantive
provisions from 2001 to 2006-reflecting the fact that the rules are drafted in consultation
with, and are approved by, the CSRC. The repeated revisions to the listing rules have
tended to strengthen the exchanges' oversight powers by adding more specific
requirements regarding disclosure obligations and greater emphasis on making disclosed
information available to investors. In addition, various revisions have emphasized the
exchanges' self-regulatory authority and have sought to separate the exchanges from the
CSRC. For example, earlier versions of the listing rules had stated that the exchanges
could refer serious cases of misconduct to the CSRC; such language was omitted in
revisions made in 2005. Earlier versions of the listing rules permitted the exchanges to
issue fines. In practice, however, they rarely, if ever, did so.
73. See Shanghai zhengquan jiaoyisuo gupiao shangshi guize (2006-05-19 xiuding)
[Share Listing Rules of the Shanghai Stock Exchange] (promulgated by the Shanghai
Stock Exch., May 18, 2006, effective May 19, 2006) (amended May 19, 2006) (P.R.C), ch.
17, available at http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/flgz/rules/sserules/sseruler200605
19.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Shanghai Listing Rules]
(provisions on oversight and punishment); Shenzhen zhengquan jiaoyisuo gupiao
shangshi guize (2006 nian 5 yue xiu Ding) [Share Listing Rules of the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange] (promulgated by the Shenzhen Stock Exch., May 19, 2006, effective May 19,
2006) (amended May 2006) (P.R.C.), ch. 17, available at http://www.szse.cn/UpFiles/
Attach/1412/2006/05/18/1831327522.doc (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Shenzhen Listing Rules] (provisions on oversight and punishment).
74. See Shanghai Listing Rules, supra note 73, ch. 12; Shenzhen Listing Rules, supra
note 73, ch. 16.
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has taken some steps to establish clearer standards. Thus, for example, in
2005 the Shenzhen Exchange issued the Guidelines for Directors of Listed
Companies, which specifies circumstances where an individual may be
deemed unsuitable to continue to serve as a director. These include hav-
ing been subject to two public criticisms or three criticisms from the
Exchange within the prior three years. 75 The Shenzhen Exchange also
maintains internal, nonpublic standards that determine whether particu-
lar conduct will result in a public criticism or a lesser form of reprimand.
The standards specify certain types of misconduct that will automatically
give rise to a public criticism. 76 For other forms of misconduct, including
failure to disclose certain related party transactions or failure to disclose
loans or loan guarantees, the Shenzhen Exchange's standards look to
whether or not the value of the transaction equaled a specified percent-
age of the company's registered capital or net assets. 7 7 Shenzhen
Exchange officials state that their decision not to make the standards
public is due to the fact that the Chinese market "is not sophisticated";
officials are concerned that if companies were aware of the specific stan-
dards, they might manipulate their disclosure so as to avoid sanctions. 78
Exchange officials note that in most cases companies are required to dis-
close transactions that fall below the percentage thresholds as well as
those that exceed the thresholds-only the sanction, not the disclosure
obligation, turns on the size of the undisclosed transaction. 79
By contrast, in interviews Shanghai Exchange officials did not men-
tion the existence of standards similar to those in Shenzhen. Indeed,
some Shanghai Exchange officials note and complain about the lack of
clear provisions governing the conditions under which companies may be
sanctioned.8 0 The extensive discretion vested in the hands of the ex-
changes in making determinations between serious and lesser miscon-
duct may allow the exchanges flexibility in combating new forms of mis-
conduct. But such discretion also suggests that other considerations,
75. Shenzhen zhengquan jiaoyisuo zhongxiao chuangye bankuai shangshi gongsi
dongshi xingwei zhiyin [Guidelines for Behavior by Directors of Companies Listed on the
Small and Medium Enterprise Board of the Shenzhen Exchange] (promulgated by the
Shenzhen Stock Exch., Mar. 1, 2005, effective Mar. 1, 2005) (P.R.C.), art. 41, available at
http://www.szse.cn/main/rule/jysywgz/200503036850.shtml (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Guidelines for Behavior]. Other circumstances giving rise to a
ban on serving as a director include a finding that the individual has insufficient time to
dedicate to company business, being subject to two public criticisms from the CSRC within
three years, serious dereliction of duty or misuse of position, or causing serious harm to
the company or the interests of public shareholders. Id. The Shanghai Stock Exchange
does not appear to have adopted similar rules.
76. Interview 2007-1.
77. Id.; Interview 2007-5.
78. Interview 2007-4.
79. Id. Officials also state that from time to time they may adjust the standards, and
that making specific thresholds public might make such adjustments more difficult.
80. Interview 2006-72.
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including external pressure, may play a role in determining whether a
company receives a public criticism or a lesser form of reprimand.8 1
A. Data on Public Criticisms
Table 4 sets forth the number of public criticisms issued by both ex-
changes from 2001 through 2006. As the table shows, the Shanghai Stock
Exchange issued a total of 109 public criticisms between 2001 and 2006.
The exchange issued sanctions against eighty-nine different companies.
Sixteen companies received two public criticisms; one company received
three.8 2 In addition, eight companies that received public criticisms (in-
cluding three that were criticized twice) were subsequently delisted from
the exchange, although not necessarily for the same conduct. During the
same period, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued 149 public criticisms,
against 116 different companies. One company was publicly criticized
four times; three were publicly criticized three times; and twenty were
publicly criticized twice. Eleven of the companies that received public
criticisms were subsequently delisted, including one that had been criti-
cized three times and one that had been criticized twice.
TABLE 4: NUMBER OF PUBLIC CRITICISMS OF LISTED COMPANIES BY STOCK
EXCHANGES, 2001-200683
Year Shanghai Stock Exchange Shenzhen Stock Exchange
2001 16 (646) 32 (514)
2002 16 (715) 21 (509)
2003 19 (780) 17 (507)
2004 21 (837) 18 (540)
2005 18 (834) 33 (544)
2006 19 (840) 28 (533)
Total 109 149
Source: Stock Exchange Public Criticisms
indicates number of listed companies as of December 3184
81. It is procedurally easier for the exchanges to issue lesser sanctions than more
serious ones. In Shanghai, for example, individual departments within the exchange may
issue oral warnings and oversight letters without approval of senior stock exchange officials
outside their departments. Most are issued by the Listed Companies Department.
Interview 2006-68. Both notices of criticism and public criticisms are prepared by
individual departments, generally the Listed Companies Division, but then must be
approved by the Stock Exchange Council, which includes directors of the exchange and
also department heads from the exchange. Interview 2006-69(2).
82. Multiple sanctions against a single company reflect multiple instances of
misconduct. The exchanges do not criticize a company twice for the same conduct,
although companies frequently have multiple problems-and uncovering one problem
may lead the exchanges to discover others. Interview 2006-69(2).
83. The data include all publicly available exchange-issued public criticisms. It is
possible that a small number of additional public criticisms were issued but not listed on
the exchange's website.
84. Numbers of listed companies are from the websites of the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.
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Sanctions are issued by the exchanges for six different reasons: false
or materially misleading disclosure, inaccurate or late profit forecast, fail-
ure to make timely disclosure of major corporate matters, failure to un-
dertake approval procedures for related party transactions, failure to is-
sue periodic reports on time, and failure to carry out other legal
obligations.8 5 Both exchanges issue the majority of their criticisms for
failure to make timely disclosure of major corporate matters (34% of the
total criticisms issued by Shanghai; 30% of the total for Shenzhen).86
About 20% of the criticisms at both exchanges are issued for failure to
make timely amendments to profit forecasts or for frequent changes to
forecasts. Exchange officials noted a trend toward putting more empha-
sis on disclosure in recent years, in particular information relating to
loans and loan guarantees issued in the past.8 7
In the majority of cases in which the exchanges sanctioned listed
companies, they also sanctioned individuals.88 Between 2001 and 2006,
the Shanghai Stock Exchange sanctioned 782 individuals; the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange publicly criticized 876 individuals. In a small number of
cases the exchanges acted against only individuals, not listed companies.
Shanghai issued three sanction decisions against individuals only, cover-
85. These categories are our own, and are based on review of the public criticisms.
86. The following table lists the frequency with which various types of criticisms are
issued by the exchanges over the period 2001-2006. A company is sanctioned when the
exchange issues a criticism. Many sanctions punish companies for multiple cases of
misconduct. In such cases, the table counts a reason as a percentage of the total number
of reasons given for the criticism (e.g., a company that is sanctioned for false disclosure
and for failure to issue scheduled reports on time is counted as 0.5 in each category). Thus
the total number of companies sanctioned for each category of wrongdoing is in fact
higher than indicated in the table below:
Reason for Sanction Shanghai Shenzhen
1. False Information Disclosure or seriously
misleading statements 7+2/3 (7.30%) 12+1/12 (8.11%)
2. Profit forecast not accurate or not timely
(generally failure to amend forecasts in cases
of significant discrepancy or frequent
changes to predictions) 21+1/3 (19.57%) 30+1/4 (20.30%)
3. Failure to timely disclose major corporate
matters 37 (33.94%) 44+3/4 (30.03%)
4. Failure to carry out approval procedures
for related-party transactions 17 (15.60%) 24+5/12 (16.39%)
5. Failure to issue scheduled reports on time 23 (21.10%) 26 (17.45%)
6. Failure to carry out other legally-required
obligations 3 (2.75%) 11+1/2 (7.72%)
Total, 2001-2006 109 149
87. Interview 2007-29.
88. Forty of the sanctions in Shenzhen were against only companies and not
individuals; fifty-five Shanghai sanctions involved only companies.
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TABLE 5: NUMBER OF CRITICISMS OF INDIVIDUALS, 2001-2006
Year Shanghai Stock Exchange Shenzhen Stock Exchange
2001 11 105
2002 156 28
2003 173 110
2004 134 101
2005 159 256
2006 149 276
Total 782 876
Source: Stock Exchange Public Criticisms
ing six individuals. Shenzhen issued ten public criticisms against individ-
uals only.8 9
TABLE 6: POSITION OF CRITICIZED INDIVIDUALS
Shanghai Stock Shenzhen Stock
Position of Sanctioned Individual Exchange Exchange
Executive Director 645 735
Independent Director 25 40
Board Secretary 11 7
Supervisor 91 64
Chief Accountant/CFO 4 3
Other Management 6 27
Source: Stock Exchange Public Criticisms
As Table 6 shows, executive directors were the most frequent target
of sanctions, followed by supervisors. 90 Independent directors were
targeted for sanction far less often, although this appears to be an artifact
of the relative newness of the institution. Most companies in China have
only recently added independent directors to their boards. In fact, the
exchanges appear to be increasingly scrutinizing the roles of indepen-
dent directors: Of the forty Shenzhen Stock exchange sanctions against
independent directors, ten were in 2005 and twenty-eight were in 2006.
More severe than issuing a public criticism against an individual is a
stock exchange determination that an individual is unfit to serve as a di-
rector, supervisor, or senior manager. The exchanges have used this
power sparingly. The Shanghai Stock Exchange has declared fifteen indi-
89. We arrived at these numbers after reviewing the data and counting up all the
publicly issued sanctions individually. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
90. Chinese company law provides for a German-inspired supervisory board as well as
a board of directors. Most commentators are critical of the corporate governance role
actually performed by the supervisory board in Chinese corporations. See, e.g., Chao Xi,
In Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model: Board Reforms and the Political
Economy of Corporate Law in China, 22 Conn. J. Int'l L. 1, 3-7, 12-13 (2006) (discussing
factors that contribute to "figurehead" status of typical Chinese supervisory boards
including limited disclosure of company information, lack of attendance requirements for
board meetings, inability to consult with outside experts, and not having enough truly
independent members).
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viduals to be unfit for service, including ten in November 2006 alone.
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange has made only one such determination.9 '
Shanghai's dramatic surge in the use of this sanction in late 2006 may
signal a policy of making greater use of this regulatory weapon, although
it is too early to be certain.
B. Delegating Enforcement from the CSRC to the Stock Exchanges?
What is the relationship between the respective regulatory efforts by
the stock exchanges and the CSRC? The public criticisms issued by the
exchanges largely complement, rather than duplicate, regulatory efforts
by the CSRC. Some level of coordination of regulatory activity between
the CSRC and the exchanges is apparent, but the exchanges also seem to
be operating with a degree of autonomy. The motivations for exchange
autonomy, however, are ambiguous. In most cases, exchange sanctions
are separate from and do not lead to CSRC punishment. Only twenty-
eight of the eighty-nine companies sanctioned by the Shanghai Exchange
were also subject to CSRC administrative punishments, of which only
eleven cases involved the same or related conduct.9 2 The same tendency
is evident in Shenzhen. Thirty-one companies were sanctioned by both
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the CSRC, of which only nineteen
cases involved the same or related conduct.9 3 The lack of overlap in part
reflects the fact that many of the exchange sanctions are for conduct that
is not serious enough to lead to CSRC action.9 4 Moreover, the exchanges
sometimes do not criticize a company if it has been or will be sanctioned
by the CSRC for the same conduct.95
The exchanges are not required to notify the CSRC of decisions to
criticize companies prior to doing so, and in most cases the exchanges do
not consult with the CSRC prior to taking action.9 6 In serious cases, how-
ever, the exchanges confer with the CSRC prior to taking action.9 7 The
91. In contrast, during the same period the CSRC issued market bans, ranging from
three years to life, against eighty-two individuals. CSRC regulations specify that the CSRC
may ban individuals found to have committed serious breaches of the law or administrative
regulations from participation in China's securities market for periods ranging from three
years to life. Provisions on Banning Entry, supra note 45. In contrast to CSRC market
bans, exchange declarations of unfitness to serve have no time limit. See Shanghai Listing
Rules, supra note 73, ch. 17 (stating power to declare unfit but does not mention time
limit); Shenzhen Listing Rules, supra note 73, ch. 17 (same).
92. We arrived at these numbers after reviewing the data and counting up all the
publicly issued sanctions individually. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
94. Similarly, oversight letters and oral warnings generally relate to violations of
exchange rules, and rarely involve overlap with CSRC regulations. Interview 2006-68;
Interview 2006-69.
95. Interview 2006-68; Interview 2006-69.
96. Interview 2007-1. As noted above, prior to 2005 the listing rules explicitly stated
that the exchanges could refer serious cases to the CSRC.
97. Interview 2006-1; Interview 2006-7.
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exchanges do inform the CSRC of both public criticisms and of the non-
public notice and criticisms after they are issued. 98
Exchange officials claim that they are largely autonomous in their
decisions to sanction, but in practice the relationship may be somewhat
more complex. In some cases, the exchanges coordinate their activities
with the CSRC.99 Sometimes misconduct first comes to light through ex-
change criticism; the CSRC then follows up and eventually decides to
sanction the companies. 100 In others, misconduct is first uncovered by
the local branch office of the CSRC and then reported to the exchanges
for sanction. In sensitive cases, the CSRC may instruct the exchanges not
to get involved.10 1 Despite the theoretical independence of the ex-
changes from the CSRC under the new securities law, in practice the ex-
changes' roles continue to be both coordinated with and subject to over-
sight from the CSRC.
As a matter of regulatory strategy, exchange sanctions have some sig-
nificant advantages over CSRC actions: The exchanges generally take ac-
tion within a few months against companies that violate the listing rules;
sometimes they act within a few days of discovering misconduct.10 2 By
contrast, it is common for CSRC punishments to be issued two or more
years after the wrongdoing occurred.10 3 Yet some argue that the CSRC is
encouraging a greater role for the exchanges in overseeing listed compa-
nies in order to reduce its own role.'0 4 According to such arguments, the
CSRC is overworked; it also often comes under extensive external pres-
98. Interview 2007-5.
99. Interview 2006-72.
100. Interview 2007-6.
101. Interview 2006-68; Interview 2006-69.
102. Exchange officials state that it is rare for more than six months to elapse from
the time the exchange uncovers wrongdoing to the time they issue a sanction, and that
they frequently issue public criticisms within one or two months. Interview 2007-5.
103. For example, the CSRC did not issue punishments against Xintai Technology
Company for improper accounting practices and making untrue statements until two years
after the wrongdoing. See CSRC, Zhongguo Zhengjianhui xingzheng chufajueding shu
[CSRC Administrative Sanction Decision], available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n
776436/n3376288/n3376382/n3418730/n3418896/3471416.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Likewise, the CSRC did not issue
punishments against Fujian Provincial Shenlong Development Company for various
wrongdoings that occurred in 2001 until 2004, three years after the wrongdoing. See
CSRC, Zhongguo Zhengjianhui xingzheng chufa jueding shu [CSRC Administrative
Sanction Decision], available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n776436/n3376288/n3
376382/n3418730/n3418940/3440261.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2008) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Jing Ru Shi Tou, Guanyu shenli zhengquan shichang yin xujia
chenshu yinfa de minshi peichang anjian de ruogan guiding de fenxi [Analysis of Certain
Rules of the Supreme People's Court Regarding Civil Compensation Lawsuits Arising from
Stock Market False Statements], Dongfang boke [East Blog], June 1, 2007, at http://blog4.
eastmoney.com/chujun006,443582.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In
general, the CSRC is perceived as moving slowly in its sanctioning activity. Interview 2007-
5.
104. Interview 2006-61; Interview 2007-35.
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sure not to take actions against listed companies. Encouraging the stock
exchanges to play a greater role may deflect some of the pressure. Some
lawyers argue that encouraging the exchanges to play a greater role also
allows companies to be sanctioned without incurring the risk of civil liti-
gation, as exchange sanctions cannot serve as a basis for civil suits
brought by shareholders, or the even more severe reputational effects
that might follow from CSRC sanctions. This view is not uniformly held,
however, in particular because civil liability is not yet a major concern for
most listed companies. 10 5
Data for the years 2001 to 2006 reported in Table 4 suggest that the
frequency with which the exchanges impose public criticisms has fluctu-
ated from year to year, generally ranging from ten to twenty-five per year.
Officials with both the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges, however, state
that in recent years both exchanges have moved toward stricter standards
governing public criticisms and stricter application of their rules. 10 6 Offi-
cials comment that the exchanges and the market are placing greater
attention on sanctions.10 7 This reflects a general trend in the P.R.C. capi-
tal markets: Regulators and investors alike are paying more attention to
the fundamentals of corporate governance.' 0 8 Exchange officials state
that in recent years companies are clearly taking the risk of being sanc-
tioned far more seriously than they did in the past.1 0 9
Table 4, viewed in tandem with Table 3, does not reveal any obvious
trend toward reduced CSRC oversight in favor of the exchanges. The
CSRC issued a total of 198 sanction decisions between 2001 and 2006,
with a high of forty-nine in 2004 and a low of seventeen in 2002. Of
these, a total of eighty-seven sanctions related to disclosure problems,
with a high of twenty-seven in 2004 and a low of six in 2002. The data,
however, do make clear that the CSRC is targeting only a small percent-
age of the companies and individuals publicly criticized by the exchanges,
suggesting that the public criticisms are complementing CSRC
enforcement.
In conclusion, the CSRC seems to be encouraging the exchanges to
play a greater enforcement role,1 10 but the reasons for doing so are am-
biguous. It may be part of a regulatory strategy to maximize sanctioning
capacity and improve compliance with disclosure obligations by granting
greater autonomy to the exchanges. An increased role for the exchanges
may also reflect the real difficulties the CSRC faces in its attempt to ad-
dress the myriad of problems in China's securities markets: The CSRC
may not be able to tackle all disclosure issues, even if it wanted to do so.
An additional motive may be the desire to insulate the CSRC from the
105. Interview 2006-61.
106. Interview 2006-63; Interview 2007-1; Interview 2007-6.
107. Interview 2007-5.
108. Interview 2007-35.
109. Interview 2007-1.
110. Id.
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influence of companies seeking to block the imposition of administrative
punishments, in particular relatively minor ones.11 1
C. Regulatory Competition Between the Stock Exchanges
Whatever the larger forces driving the use of public criticisms by the
exchanges, the data suggest that Shanghai and Shenzhen do not utilize
this form of self-regulation to the same extent. Shenzhen has issued
more sanctions than Shanghai, despite having significantly fewer listed
companies. In fact, as a percentage of listed firms, in any given year and
over the six year period, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange has issued about
twice as many public criticisms as the Shanghai Stock Exchange.1 1 2
The frequency with which public criticisms are issued by the two ex-
changes may simply be endogenous to the firms listed on the exchanges.
Shenzhen lists comparatively smaller firms than Shanghai, and small
firms are more likely than large firms to be sanctioned for fraud by the
CSRC and stock exchanges. 113 This could be because smaller firms may
have weaker governance practices than the larger firms, resulting in the
issuance of more sanctions. Shanghai Stock Exchange officials (unsur-
prisingly) offer this explanation.1 14 Alternatively, larger firms may be
more politically insulated from criticism than smaller firms. Predictably,
Shenzhen Stock Exchange officials favor this explanation. 1 15 Data from
CSRC sanctions provide some support for the Shanghai argument: Dur-
ing the period under study, the CSRC issued administrative sanctions
stemming from false or misleading disclosure against forty-three
Shenzhen-listed companies versus forty Shanghai-listed firms, despite the
fact that far more companies are listed in Shanghai. 1 6 Yet such data can
also be interpreted to support the Shenzhen view: The CSRC may shy
away from punishing powerful companies listed in Shanghai. As we dis-
cuss further below, both exchanges sanction private companies more
often than state-owned companies, despite private companies making up
a minority of all listed firms. This fact, however, can likewise support
111. Id.; Interview 2007-6. This suggestion, however, may be undermined by the fact
that the CSRC still maintains the ability to dictate outcomes to the exchanges. Thus in
more serious cases, companies will still seek to influence the exchanges by influencing the
CSRC. This is particularly true for the most powerful companies.
112. Shenzhen criticizes from 3% to 6% of listed firms in a given year, and its total
criticisms equal 28% of the average number of listed firms over the six year period.
Shanghai has consistently criticized about 2% of listed firms in a given year, and its total
criticisms constitute 14% of the average number of listed firms over the six year period.
These percentages were calculated from Table 4. See supra Table 4.
113. Chen et al., Toothless Tiger, supra note 9, at 469.
114. Interview 2006-68; Interview 2006-69.
115. Interview 2007-7; Interview 2007-35. Some Shenzhen officials do, however, also
accept that large state-owned companies, which predominate in Shanghai, may also have
stronger corporate governance practices than many of the small private companies listed
in Shenzhen. Interview 2007-1; Interview 2007-7.
116. The total is eighty-three, not the eighty-seven reported in Table 3, because four
sanctions reported there were against individuals only.
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either view: Private firms may be less politically connected than state-
owned firms, but they may also tend to have weaker governance.
The difference, however, may also represent different regulatory
strategies by the two exchanges, reflecting the competitive positions of
the two organizations. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange has long been re-
garded as the weaker sibling of the Shanghai Exchange. Although the
two exchanges do not compete directly for listings in most cases, in a
larger sense both exchanges are competing with Hong Kong and
Singapore for listings, particularly over the long term, and thus for reve-
nue resulting from listings. The Shenzhen Exchange's more aggressive
regulatory approach may be part of an attempt to distinguish itself from
the Shanghai Stock Exchange and to close the distance between it and its
rival. Observers not affiliated with either exchange argue that the
Shenzhen Exchange is more aggressive in policing its companies than its
counterpart in Shanghai.1 17 Indeed, Shenzhen Exchange officials assert
that they have tried to become stricter in their oversight of listed compa-
nies to generate greater confidence in the market. 118 The stricter stan-
dards in Shenzhen are reflected not only in the numbers of sanctions
issued, but also in the clearer standards that apply (at least internally) for
deciding to issue public criticisms and in the stricter standards governing
directors that apply to companies on the SMEB. 119
The Shenzhen Exchange's strategy of stricter enforcement is not uni-
versally viewed as positive for the development of China's securities mar-
kets given current institutional realities. Some market actors claim that
strict enforcement of rules is counterproductive and unrealistic at this
stage of China's development. Regulatory flexibility, the argument goes,
is better suited to current market conditions. 120 The Shanghai Stock
Exchange is widely perceived as more flexible, easier to communicate
with, and more willing to negotiate to resolve problems than the
Shenzhen Exchange. 121 The Shenzhen Exchange is perceived as more
rule- and disclosure-oriented. 122 As one lawyer argued, "Shanghai has a
more practical appraisal of reality. 1 23 Strict rules may enhance the
117. Interview 2007-7; Interview 2007-35.
118. Interview 2007-1; Interview 2007-5.
119. See supra note 73 and accompanying text; infra note 166 and accompanying
text.
120. Interview 2007-29.
121. Id.
122. Id.; Interview 2007-30; Interview 2007-34.
123. Interview 2007-34. The lawyer gave the example of disclosure requirements
regarding related party transactions, whereby companies are required to disclose
transactions beyond a certain size. As the lawyer explained, one company he represents
engaged in transactions that exceed this threshold every day, thus in principle requiring
disclosure of each. He asserted that the Shanghai Exchange would understand if the
company failed to disclose each individual transaction, while the Shenzhen Exchange
'would just sanction you." Id.
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Shenzhen Exchange's reputation, but they also may scare away some
companies.
Regardless of which regulatory strategy is better suited to develop-
ment of China's stock markets, the available evidence suggests that the
two stock exchanges, despite their limited room for autonomous action,
are pursuing somewhat different paths toward that goal. Indeed, the fact
that the exchanges are competing with each other at all suggests that the
exchanges have become more autonomous, at least as compared to the
recent past. Such trends also support the impression that the regulatory
roles of the exchanges reflect a conscious effort by the CSRC not only to
delegate authority, but also to encourage experimentation and innova-
tion. Even subtle competition by state-controlled exchanges may be a
means of fostering multiple approaches to enforcement.
III. EFFECTS
The discussion to this point raises an obvious question: Should we
care? The role of stock exchange criticisms in the development of
China's capital markets depends upon their effectiveness. In this Part, we
try to assess their effect on a range of market actors-investors, creditors,
directors, other corporate officials, and the corporate entity itself. Part A
discusses company efforts to block the criticisms, which suggests that the
companies themselves seek to avoid this informal sanction. Part B applies
event study methodology to assess the stock price effects of the public
criticisms as well as the corporate disclosures of the underlying miscon-
duct that generated the criticisms. Part C examines other possible effects
of the public criticisms, including restrictions on financing, career dam-
age to the individuals involved, and reputational effects on companies
and individuals who are criticized by the exchanges. Part D summarizes
our principal conclusions.
We acknowledge the inherent difficulty of this task and concede the
necessarily impressionistic nature of some of our analysis. However, the
discussion that follows is based on both widely used event study method-
ology and extensive interviews of market participants in China. A remark-
ably consistent picture emerges from our research: The public criticisms
matter, and they are taking on greater importance in the regulatory
scheme.
A. Efforts to Block Stock Exchange Criticisms
One measure of the effects of public criticisms is the degree to which
company officials try to persuade the exchanges not to issue them.
Exchange officials state that they are frequently subject to pressure from
companies not to issue sanctions. 12 4 Prior to issuing a public criticism,
the exchanges inform the target companies of their decision and permit
124. Interview 2006-68; Interview 2006-69; Interview 2007-1.
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the companies to reply within a specified period. 1 2 5 However, there are
no procedures governing how responses are to be handled.126 Some-
times companies and individuals try to persuade the relevant depart-
ments at the exchanges not to issue criticisms; in other cases they seek to
influence the leaders of the exchanges. 127 Companies occasionally use
lawyers and legal arguments to lay out a defense, but much more com-
monly they rely on relationships and in-person discussions to persuade
senior officials at the exchanges or the CSRC. 128
Efforts to persuade the exchanges not to issue public criticisms are
sometimes successful. As Table 4 indicates, in 2005 the Shanghai
Exchange issued public criticisms against eighteen companies. In ap-
proximately ten additional cases, however, the exchange dropped pro-
ceedings against companies after the initial notification that it intended
to publicly criticize them. 129 (Figures regarding Shenzhen were not avail-
able.) Although officials claim they rarely change a decision after an ini-
tial determination,13 0 they acknowledge an occasional change in re-
sponse to lobbying efforts. Most often this takes the form of not targeting
particular directors for public criticism.1 3 1 Shenzhen officials noted that
they have attempted to insulate themselves from such pressure by creat-
ing clear internal standards specifying when sanctions shall be issued, and
by vesting the decision to issue a sanction in a committee made up of
officials from a variety of departments-and not only with the leaders of
the exchange.1 3 2 In Shanghai, by contrast, exchange leaders make the
final decision regarding sanctions. At present, there is no mechanism for
appealing exchange sanctions. However, both the Shenzhen and Shang-
hai exchanges are now discussing creating a committee consisting of ex-
change officials and members from outside the exchanges that would
serve as an appeals body for public criticisms.1 33
125. Interview 2006-72; Interview 2007-5.
126. Interview 2006-68; Interview 2006-69.
127. Interview 2006-68; Interview 2006-69; Interview 2006-72; Interview 2007-1.
128. Interview 2006-70. Lawyers, exchange officials, and company managers say that
it is rare for companies to involve lawyers in such negotiations. Interview 2007-29;
Interview 2007-34. Doing so, said one CEO, would simply make matters more tense.
Interview 2007-29. Exchange officials say that they are unlikely to be influenced by
nonlegal arguments-but also acknowledge that they sometimes cannot avoid other forms
of pressure. Interview 2006-72. One CEO said that companies facing sanction will first
seek to argue their case with lower-ranking officials on the merits, but will not hesitate to
seek out more senior officials if necessary to avoid being sanctioned. Interview 2007-29.
129. Interview 2006-68; Interview 2006-69.
130. Interview 2007-4.
131. This is particularly the case when individuals can show that they objected to the
decision or action that resulted in the sanction. Id. Officials also said that in some cases
companies provide additional facts that persuade the exchange that the initial infraction
was not as serious as first contemplated. Id.
132. Interview 2007-5. Senior officials of the exchange participate in the committee,
and thus may exert some influence on committee votes, but they formally only have
individual votes in committee discussions. Interview 2007-1; Interview 2007-5.
133. Interview 2007-7.
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It is, of course, difficult to discern whether the exchanges drop cases
due to convincing legal and technical arguments or as a result of other
forms of influence. Either form of persuasion might be effective in a
given case. 1 4 One perception is that Shanghai Stock Exchange officials
are more susceptible to relational influences due to the larger number of
high-profile state-owned companies listed there.1 35  Regardless of the
type or effectiveness of lobbying, the frequency and intensity of individual
and corporate efforts to persuade the exchanges to drop the sanctions is
compelling evidence that the targets of public criticisms take them
seriously.
B. Share Price Effects
We attempted to measure stock market reaction to the public criti-
cisms. Using standard event study methodology, 3 6 we measured stock
price effects of the first public announcement of the public criticism by a
stock exchange, typically by publication in one of China's three major
securities industry newspapers. We measured the cumulative effects on
the securities of all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges
subjected to public criticism for the most serious categories of miscon-
duct, including failure to disclose material information and failure to
conduct related party transactions according to required procedures,
134. Interview 2006-71; Interview 2007-1.
135. Interview 2007-1.
136. In a stock market event study, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are
estimated by summing estimated abnormal returns over an event window. We use the
market model to calculate abnormal stock returns. For both the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges, we used the A-Share Index to control for the effect of market-related
variation on a given stock return.
We examined two event windows: a three day event window [-1,1 ] and a five day event
window [-2,2]. The estimation window dates from -250 to -7 for the three day event
window and from -250 to -8 for the five day event window.
The cumulative abnormal return from day rl to day r2 (CAR(r 1 , T2)) is calculated as:
CAR(r 1,r 2)= Y AR,
T-T,
the sum of sample-average abnormal returns through the event window [Tr,r 2], in which AR, repre-
sents the sample-average abnormal returns on the day T(T < r T2).
N
A AR,,
AR, N
Where, AR,,: company-specific abnormal return of stock i at time T
N: number of stocks in the sample
In the market model, A&,T is calculated as ART = RI - i -i (&,T) where R,T is the actual
stock return of company i at time T and R, is the market return at time T. The parameters di
and f are estimated from the market model.
&. = a + f3,R,. + E4.
E(E ,) = 0 var(E,.T) = 01
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over the period 2001 to 2006.13 7 Publication of the criticisms resulted in
negative and significant abnormal returns for both the Shanghai and
Shenzhen exchanges in all specifications of the data but one. 138
We also measured the stock market reaction to the first company
disclosure of the underlying misconduct that eventually resulted in the
public criticism. Company disclosure resulted in significant negative ab-
normal returns for both exchanges in all specifications.' 3 9 Since the
company disclosure occurred, on average, 45.8 days prior to the Shanghai
Stock Exchange criticisms and 66.5 days prior to the Shenzhen criticisms,
at least some of the disclosures were almost certainly prompted by the
threat of criticism.1 40
TABLE 7: STOCK PRICE REACTION TO CRITICISMS AND
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
No. of Z-value Z-value
Observations CAR 3-day (CAR 3-day) CAR 5-day (CAR 5-day)
Public Criticism SHSE 68 -0.0207 -3.68*** -0.0272 -3.75***
Public Criticism SZSE 98 -0.0096 -2.05** -0.0058 -0.96
Company Disclosure SHSE 90 -0.0368 -7.59*** -0.0421 -6.72***
Company Disclosure SZSE 140 -0.0364 -9.40*** -0.0396 -7.93***
**Significant at 0.05 level
***Significant at 0.01 level
Thus, our findings suggest that the stock exchange criticisms prompt
disclosure of information that the market finds meaningful. Moreover,
the market reaction to the stock exchange criticism itself-even after the
137. We excluded from the sample firms for which complete data were unavailable,
firms that were delisted, and firms where share trading had been suspended or otherwise
displayed erratic and unexplained price movements. The sample was comprised of sixty-
eight observations for the Shanghai Exchange and ninety-eight observations for the
Shenzhen Exchange.
138. Negative abnormal returns on the Shenzhen Exchange were only marginally
significant using a five day event window. We acknowledge the possible tension between
the relative statistical strength of the market reaction to the Shanghai Exchange criticisms
vis-A-vis those of the Shenzhen Exchange on the one hand, and our conclusion in Part II.C
that the Shenzhen Exchange appears to be pursuing a stricter regulatory strategy than its
counterpart in Shanghai on the other.
139. We again excluded from the sample firms for which complete data were
unavailable, firms that were delisted, and firms where share trading had been suspended
or otherwise displayed erratic and unexplained price movements. The sample was
comprised of eighty-seven observations for the Shanghai Exchange and 138 observations
for the Shenzhen Exchange.
140. Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that causation runs in the other
direction in some or many cases: namely, that corporate disclosure of bad conduct
prompted a stock exchange criticism shortly thereafter. But given that the companies in
our sample were criticized for failure to make timely disclosure of material facts or failure
to abide by related party transaction procedures (not for disclosing bad conduct alone), it
seems rather unlikely that a large number of the firms in our sample suddenly-
unprompted by any regulatory pressure-decided to disclose past bad conduct, leading
ultimately to a stock exchange criticism.
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misconduct has been disclosed by the corporation-indicates that the
public criticism contains new information apart from the misconduct.
We cannot pinpoint precisely what new information investors glean from
the criticism itself, but we explore several possibilities below. Our inter-
views suggest the new information is that a governmental entity (the stock
exchange) has investigated the corporation and made a finding of mis-
conduct, which jeopardizes the corporation's future profitability. In any
event, our results indicate that investors care about the criticisms.
Our findings are generally consistent with prior studies, though most
findings are not directly comparable to our own. The only prior English-
language study on stock price effects of criticisms found negative and sig-
nificant abnormal returns to public criticisms issued between 1999 and
2003.141 The findings of Chinese-language studies are mixed, though
most find a significant effect. 14 2 Some scholars find that exchange sanc-
tions have a greater effect on share price than do CSRC sanctions-al-
though they explain this finding by noting that the market is more likely
to be aware in advance of CSRC investigations than of exchange sanc-
tions. 1 43 Other studies find that effects on share price are negligible; one
141. Chen et al., Toothless Tiger, supra note 9, at 470-73. Due to the methodology
employed by the authors of this study, however, these findings are not directly comparable
to ours because their data include some public criticisms issued by the CSRC as well as the
stock exchanges; also they cover an earlier time period.
142. For example, one study of the consequences of exchange sanctions in 2001 and
2002 found significant market reactions to public criticisms imposed by the exchanges.
The study found that the effects were insignificant in cases where the misconduct had
already been disclosed. Dong Jun, Zhengquan jiaoyisuo gongkai qianze zhidu you
xiaoxing de shizheng yanjiu [Empirical Research into the Effectiveness of the Public
Criticism System of Stock Exchanges], 15 World Econ. Outlook 8, 10 (2004). Another
study examined the market effects based on the type of conduct being sanctioned, finding
that misrepresentations regarding income-related information and violations relating to
failure to disclose related party transactions or financial guarantees had the most
significant effects on share price; sanctions relating to untimely disclosure and
unauthorized use of funds generated no significant market reaction. However, the study
did not distinguish between CSRC and exchange sanctions. Xue Feng, Dong Yingying &
Guan Wei, Zhongguo shangshi gongsi gupiao xinyong fengxian de shijian yanjiu [An
Event-Study on Credit Risk of the Stocks of Chinese Listed Companies], Zhongyang caijing
daxue xuebao [4J. Cent. U. Fin. & Econ. 35, 35-38 (2004)].
143. For example, one study that examined sanction data from 1993 to 2001
(including both exchange and CSRC sanctions) found significant market effects of public
sanctions, but no effects of nonpublic sanctions and warnings. The study also found
greater effects of exchange sanctions than CSRC sanctions, with the authors suggesting
that the likely reason was prior market awareness of CSRC proceedings. Mao Zhirong &
Wu Linyang, Xinxi pilu weigui chufa shiji xiaoguo yanjiu [Research on the Actual Effects
of Sanctions for Violations of Information Disclosure Regulations], Zhengquan shibao
[Securities Times], May 21, 2002, available at http://www.chinacfa.cn/jinronglunwen/
zhengquanqihuo/gupiaoshichang/gupiaoshichangl4455.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). Another early study of exchange and CSRC sanctions using event study
methodology likewise found that exchange sanctions had more significant effects than
CSRC sanctions. Wen Shouxun & Yang Wu, Shangshi gongsi weigui xinxi pilou chufa
xiaoguo de yanjiu [Research on Penalty Effects of Listed Firms' Information Disclosure
Violations], Chongqing daxue xuebao [25 J. Chongqing U. 83, 85 (2002)]; see also Yan
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less rigorous study suggests that share price may actually increase upon
the issuance of an exchange sanction.' 4 4 None of the studies, however,
examines the broader potential effects of stock exchange public criti-
cisms, as we do below.
Before we turn to broader effects, however, we wish to address sev-
eral potential alternative interpretations of our findings. First, investors
may react to a public criticism not because of concern about the quality
of the company's public disclosures or corporate governance practices,
but because they believe a sanction signals that a company has fallen out
of political favor. 145 Put differently, investors may believe that a stock
exchange criticism is a statement that a company lacks sufficient political
leverage to avoid punishment, and is thus unable to compete fully in
China's politically sensitive marketplace. Implicit in this possible inter-
pretation of our findings is the view that the exchanges are neither inde-
pendent nor politically neutral. If this view is accurate, the exchanges
would target only small or politically unconnected companies.
The data show, however, that although the majority of sanctioned
companies are indeed private, the exchanges have also targeted some key
state-owned enterprises. Table 8 classifies companies criticized in the pe-
Guoxing, Chen Chao & Zhou Xiaohe, Shangshi gongsi weigui chufa shizheng fenxi
[Empirical Analysis of Sanctions Against Listed Companies for Violations of Regulations],
Jingji luntan [Economic Tribune], Apr. 2006, at 111 (arguing exchange sanctions have
greater effect on share price than CSRC sanctions due to market awareness of CSRC
proceedings before sanction announcements; also finding many sanctioned companies
come from electronic and light manufacturing industries, and arguing high rate of
recidivism suggested low deterrence value of both CSRC and exchange sanctions).
Such findings are not uniform: A study that used event study methodology to analyze
CSRC and exchange sanction data from 1999 to 2005 found that market reaction to
exchange public criticisms was weaker than that to CSRC sanctions. The study found a
significant negative market reaction to both CSRC sanctions and exchange public
criticisms. The study also showed market reactions strengthening over time. Zhang Hong,
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Shangshi gongsi weigui tezheng ji chufa youxiaoxing yanjiu
20-23 [Research into the Special Characteristics of Violations of Regulations by Listed
Companies and the Effectiveness of Sanctions], available at http://www.szse.cn/UpFiles/
Attach/1947/2006/04/03/1052192247.doc (last visited Jan. 30, 2008) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
144. One study argued that the effects of public criticism have actually weakened over
time, and that the stock prices of some companies have increased upon the company being
publicly criticized. The study's findings were largely anecdotal, however, and the author
does not appear to have used event study methodology. See Zhang Xuming, Cong
"gongkai qianze" de xiaoguo ruohua tan woguo shangshi gongsi dejianguan [Discussing
Oversight of Listed Companies in Our Nation from the Perspective of the Weakening
Effects of "Public Criticisms"], Hubeijingji xueyuan xuebao: ren wen she hui ke xue ban
J. Hubei U. Econ. (Human. & Soc. Sci.)], Apr. 2005, at 132-33. One author cited the
ineffectiveness of exchange sanctions as an argument for strengthening a legal approach
to regulating corporate misconduct. Li Dongping, 477 Ci qianze buru 1 ci panjue [477
Criticisms Are Not as Valuable as 1 Court Judgment], Zhengquan shibao [Securities
Times], Dec. 1, 2004, available at http://yjbg.stock.cnfol.com/041201/139,1333,1136284,
00.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
145. We thank John Coffee for raising this possible interpretation of our findings.
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riod from 2001 to 2006 as either private or state-owned. Table 8 includes
only those companies sanctioned for major misconduct-the same com-
panies used in our event study sample. For state-owned companies, the
table indicates whether the controlling shareholder (or parent thereof)
was a national, provincial, or local governmental entity. At the national
and provincial level, distinctions are also drawn between companies di-
rectly or indirectly under the National State-Owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission and those controlled by other central
government entities. The distinction reflects the fact that shares in many
of China's most important state-owned companies (with the exception of
those in the financial services industries, which are controlled by a sepa-
rate holding company) are controlled by the Assets Commission. The
Assets Commission holds controlling stakes in 158 central companies;
through these holdings it directly or indirectly oversees 165 publicly listed
companies.1 46 Thus in general, companies managed by the Assets
Commission are likely to be politically more important and more influen-
tial than other state-owned companies. 147
TABLE 8: COMPANIES SANCTIONED 2001-2006 FOR MAJOR MISCONDUCT, BY
STATE-AFFILIATION 
1 4 8
Number of Sanctioned Number of Sanctioned
Actual Controlling Entity Companies-Shenzhen Companies-Shanghai Total
National State-Owned Assets
Supervision and Administration
Commission 6 6 12
Other Central Government
Departments and Commissions 2 6 8
Provincial State-Owned Assets
Management Authorities 15 9 24
Provincial Governments 2 1 3
Other (lower-ranking governments) 22 12 34
State-Owned Companies Total 47 34 81
Private Companies 70 43 113
Total 117 77 194
Source: Calculations based on company annual reports
Table 8 reveals two noteworthy facts. First, private companies make
up the majority of sanctioned companies-roughly 58% of all sanctioned
companies were private. This contrasts with the market as a whole, where
the majority of listed companies in China are state-owned or affiliated.
Although neither the exchanges nor the CSRC appear to provide a break-
146. For a list of the companies directly controlled by the Assets Commission (also
called "central enterprises"), see Zhongyang qiye minglu [Central Enterprises List], at
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/nI180/ni226/n2425/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
147. Provincial assets commissions likewise hold shares in key provincial companies.
148. Criticisms for minor misconduct-most often failure to file timely reports-have
been excluded. Information on ownership was obtained from review of company annual
reports.
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down of the total number of companies by ownership, officials at the ex-
changes estimated that state-owned companies account for approximately
60% of listed companies.149 The greater frequency with which private
companies are criticized may suggest that private companies are easier
targets than state-owned companies, as they may lack strong political con-
nections. But the trend may also reflect lower governance standards in
private companies, an opinion voiced by many of our interviewees.
Second, although most criticized state-owned companies are at-
tached to provincial or local governments, a significant number of sanc-
tioned companies are major state-owned companies, some of which are
directly under the supervision of the Assets Commission. Criticized com-
panies in Shanghai included Shanghai Worldbest Pharmaceuticals, a ma-
jor pharmaceutical producer and a subsidiary of one of China's leading
industrial conglomerates and its largest pharmaceutical manufacturer;
Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle, a key manufacturer of motorcycles that is di-
rectly under central Party-state management; and China Eastern Airlines,
one of China's three biggest airlines. Most of these companies are house-
hold names in China.
In Shenzhen, the criticized companies were perhaps somewhat less
well-known, but nevertheless included six controlled by the State Assets
Commission. These included Shenyang Chemical, a major chemical pro-
ducer that is a subsidiary of China National Blue Star, one of China's
largest chemical companies; SinosteelJilin Carbon, which is China's larg-
est carbon producer, and a subsidiary of Sinosteel, one of China's major
steel-trading firms; and San Jiu Medical and Pharmaceutical, a major
pharmaceuticals company.
These data do not prove lack of political interference in the stock
exchange criticism process; indeed, as we discuss further below, political
ties do seem to affect sanction decisions in some cases. But the data show
that the exchanges have in some cases been willing to sanction influen-
tial, well-known state-owned or affiliated companies. This suggests that
politics alone cannot explain the exchanges' behavior, and that investors
are not likely to be acting purely on a perception that sanctioned compa-
nies have fallen out of political favor.
A second possible interpretation of our findings is that, in a relatively
inefficient market, investors may simply be reacting uncritically to any
negative attention brought to bear on a listed firm by an organ of the
149. These estimates are supported by public official statements. For example, in
2006 the head of the national State Assets Commission stated that 56% of listed companies
were controlled by the Commission or the equivalent local-level state assets departments.
Guowuyuan guoyou zichan jiandu guanli weiyuanhui guanyu yinfa Li Rongrong tongzhi
zai quanguo guoyou zichan jiandu guanli gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua de tongzhi
[Notice Regarding the Printing and Circulation of the Speech Given by Mr. Li Rongrong
in the National State Assets Supervision Working Meeting], Mar. 6, 2007, available at
http://law.baidu.com/0036547200006e6dc971027870e0e351d68ec7ef856.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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state. 150 The event study data, however, do not support this interpreta-
tion. As Graphs 1 and 2 show, stock price reaction to both company dis-
closure and stock exchange criticism over a long (twenty day) period fol-
lowing the event suggests an efficient market response to negative
information, with stock prices falling sharply at the event date followed by
a prolonged and relatively stable period of negative cumulative abnormal
returns. If the market were reacting blindly to negative governmental
attention, stock prices could be expected to rebound quickly or move
more erratically in the period following the event.
In summary, the event study results, particularly as interpreted in the
light of our interviews and broken down by type of company sanctioned,
suggest that the stock exchange criticisms are doing some regulatory
work in the Chinese stock market. Though we cannot completely rule
out the possibility that the criticisms reflect political weakness on the part
of the companies criticized, such an interpretation is at odds with our
sense of how the stock exchanges are utilizing their informal power.
C. Other Consequences
The limited prior work on the exchange sanctions (almost all of it in
Chinese) has focused exclusively on share price effects. But share prices
may be reacting to a broad range of potentially negative consequences
for criticized firms.15 1 Given market conditions and the larger political
and social context in which Chinese-listed firms operate, to focus exclu-
sively on share price effects is to miss an opportunity to better understand
the distinctive institutional environment surrounding the application of
sanctions. Though we cannot formally disaggregate the components of
the negative stock price reaction to public criticisms, we can analytically
distinguish regulatory effects (the formal consequences of a public criticism
for the company or individual toward which it is directed as specified in
statutes or regulations) from reputational effects (the costs of a public criti-
cism to the company or individual beyond legal penalties or restrictions
on future conduct). In an effort to do so, we conducted extensive inter-
views with potentially interested constituencies in China, including offi-
cials at both the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges, CSRC offi-
cials, a central bank official, lawyers, bankers, and the CEO of a firm
facing public criticism by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
1. Financing. - The most direct consequence to a firm receiving a
public criticism by a stock exchange today is that its near-term equity fi-
nancing options are seriously compromised. Regulations first adopted in
2002 and then made stricter in 2006 provide that listed companies may
not publicly issue new stock if the company or any of its currently serving
150. We thank Robert Scott for suggesting this alternative interpretation of our data.
151. Reputational penalties affect the present value of the firm by raising the future
costs or lowering future revenues as counterparties change the terms on which they will do
business with the firm. They are distinguished from higher costs (lower revenues) due to
regulatory penalties or litigation.
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GRAPH 1: STOCK PRICE REACTION TO COMPANY DISCLOSURE
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directors, supervisors, or senior management has been publicly criticized
by a stock exchange in the preceding year. 15 2 Similarly, a private place-
152. Shangshi gongsi zhengquan faxing guanli banfa [Administrative Measures for
the Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec.
Regulatory Comm'n, May 6, 2006, effective May 8, 2006), arts. 11, 39, translated in
LawInfoChina (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (P.R.C.). Similar restrictions apply if the
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GRAPH 2: STOCK PRICE REACTION TO STOCK EXCHANGE CRITICISMS
SHSZ Public Criticism
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 121314151617181920
-0.5%
-1.0%
-1.5%
-2.0%
-2.5%
-3.0%
-3.5%
Event Date
-2.0%
Event Date
ment of shares is impermissible if a company's current directors or senior
managers have been sanctioned in the prior year. 153 And a company may
company or its senior officials have been subject to administrative punishment from the
CSRC within the prior three years.
153. Id. art. 39. Private placements are barred if current directors or senior
management have been given administrative punishment by the CSRC within the past
2008]
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not make an initial public offering of shares if any of its directors, supervi-
sors, or senior managers has been subject to a public criticism from a
stock exchange within the preceding year. 154
The severe regulatory consequences of public criticisms for compa-
nies contemplating new share issuances provide the exchanges with sig-
nificant influence. Thus, for example, the exchanges may use the threat
of a sanction to force a company to disclose certain information or to
take other actions that may be unrelated to their disclosure obliga-
tions. 1 55 The vagueness of the listing rules gives the exchanges particular
leverage over listed companies, as there is a wide range of possible inter-
pretations of companies' disclosure obligations. 15 6
Exchange criticisms can also affect a company's ability to obtain
bank loans or issue commercial paper.' 5 7 The exchanges make informa-
tion regarding companies that are subject to public criticism available to
the central bank, PBOC, to ensure that banks are aware that companies
have encountered problems.1 58 As a result, public criticism of listed com-
panies may affect the terms of loans the companies obtain, in particular
when the criticized conduct is serious. 15 9 In addition, regulations issued
three years. The rules do not appear explicitly to ban a company from selling shares
through a private placement if the company or its supervisors, or any directors or senior
officers who have already been removed from office, have been sanctioned. The rules thus
could be read to permit a private offering where only the company or supervisors have
been publicly criticized or where directors have been sanctioned but removed from office.
The rules thus suggest that looser rules apply for private placements than for public
offerings, and may reflect CSRC policy of encouraging private offerings.
154. Shouci gongkai faxing gupiao bing shangshi guanli banfa [Measures for the
Administration of Initial Public Offering and Listing of Stocks] (promulgated by the China
Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, May 17, 2006, effective May 18, 2006), art. 23, translated in
LawInfoChina (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (P.R.C.).
In the case of individuals sanctioned by the CSRC, the specified period is three years.
Rules that were in force between 2002 and 2006 likewise stated that listed companies
seeking to issue new shares could not do so if they or any director had been subject to a
public criticism by a stock exchange within the prior twelve months. Guanyu shangshi
gongsi zengfa xingu youguan tiaojian de tongzhi [Notice Regarding Conditions Related to
Supplemental Offerings of New Shares by Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China
Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, July 24, 2002, effective July 24, 2002) (repealed May 8, 2006)
(P.R.C.), art. 7, at http://www.cas.cn/html/Dir/2002/07/24/8316.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). The rules did not appear to cover public criticisms against
supervisors or senior management. Similar restrictions applied if the company or directors
had been punished by the CSRC in the prior year.
Rules in place beginning in 2001 likewise stated that, in deciding whether to authorize
a company to issue new shares, the CSRC should give "substantial consideration" to
whether the company had been sanctioned by an exchange or by the CSRC within the past
year.
155. One lawyer recounted how the Shenzhen Exchange had used the threat of a
public criticism for unrelated conduct to push a company to complete its corporate
restructuring more quickly. Interview 2007-34.
156. Id.
157. Interview 2006-1; Interview 2007-5.
158. Interview 2006-68; Interview 2006-69.
159. Interview 2006-68; Interview 2006-69; Interview 2006-72.
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by the PBOC provide that firms may not issue commercial paper if they
have committed a serious violation of law or regulation within the preced-
ing three years. 160 Although the regulations do not expressly provide
that a stock exchange criticism constitutes a serious violation, central
bank officials are said to hold that interpretation.' 6 1 The exchanges are
now working with officials in the banking sector to create a credit report-
ing system, which will include data on stock exchange criticisms. 16 2 Ex-
change officials state that they view attempts by banks and others to use
public criticisms for their own purposes to be a positive development.1 63
Exchange officials note that banks' reliance on exchange sanctions ex-
pands the influence of the exchanges and their sanctions. 164
2. Regulatory Consequences for Individuals. - A variety of collateral
consequences befall individuals who have been criticized by the stock ex-
changes. Publicly criticized directors may in practice, if not formally, be
forced to resign, in particular for companies listed in Shenzhen. Accord-
ing to various regulations promulgated by the exchanges and the CSRC,
listed companies in China are required to have independent directors. 16 5
Shenzhen stock exchange rules governing independent directors state
that during the mandatory review of directors prior to their election, the
exchange will "emphasize" whether an independent director has been
subject to either a public criticism or a notice and criticism from an ex-
change or an administrative sanction from the CSRC within the previous
three years.' 66 The rules also state that when an individual who has been
160. Duanqi rongziquan guanli banfa [Management Methods Regarding Short-Term
Financial Securities] (promulgated by the People's Bank of China, May 23, 2005, effective
May 23, 2005) (P.R.C.), art. 10, available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/detail.asp?col=330&ID
=570 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
161. Interview 2006-IM.
162. Interview 2006-IM; Interview 2007-5.
163. Interview 2007-1.
164. Interview 2007-5.
165. Shangshi gongsi zhili zhunze [Provisions on the Management of Listed
Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, July 7, 2002, effective
July 7, 2002) (P.R.C.), arts. 49-51, at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n870297/n42404
88/n8639601/8662692.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Donald C. Clarke, The
Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 125, 177,
189-201 (2006).
166. Shenzhen Stock Exch., Duli dongshi beian banfa [Methods for the Recording of
Independent Directors] (promulgated by the Shenzhen Stock Exch., May 20, 2005,
effective May 20, 2005) (P.R.C.), art. 3, available at http://www.szse.cn/main/rule/
jysywgz/fxywgz/200604058434.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Rules
governing the Shenzhen SMEB also state that the chairman of a company's board of
directors should resign if the company (not the individual) is subject to an administrative
penalty from the CSRC or a public criticism from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the
violation is "serious." See Guidelines for Behavior, supra note 75, art. 29. The regulations
state that the chairman shall personally apologize to shareholders, and in serious
circumstances resign. Similarly, article 41 of the regulations state that an individual who
has been subject to two or more exchange public criticisms or three or more exchange
internal criticisms within a three year period will be deemed to be unsuitable to serve as a
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subject to any such punishments within the prior three years is nomi-
nated to serve as an independent director, the company must disclose any
letter from the exchange "emphasizing" such punishment prior to the
shareholders meeting.167 Although the rules do not specifically bar indi-
viduals who have been criticized or sanctioned from serving, in practice
the rules have such an effect. 1 6 8 Independent directors who are named
in a public criticism cannot be reappointed as independent directors at
the company that is being sanctioned or elsewhere. 169
Criticisms may also affect compensation of criticized individuals.
CSRC regulations governing listed companies' share incentive plans state
that no individual who has been subject to a public criticism by an ex-
change within three years may be included as beneficiary of such a
plan.1 70 Similarly, Shenzhen SMEB regulations state that companies
must withhold or retract any bonus payments or allowances made to com-
pany officials who are subject to public criticisms. 17 1
Exchange criticisms may affect other market participants as well, in
particular employees of underwriters and securities companies. CSRC
provisions impose bans on employees of underwriters if they or the issu-
ers they are serving are subject to public criticisms. Provisions regarding
sponsors of securities offerings impose a three month ban on individuals
serving as representatives of sponsors, if they or the issuers they are serv-
ing as sponsors are subject to a public criticism during the due diligence
period prior to a public offering or a supervision period after the public
director for companies listed on the SMEB. Id. art. 41. Similar provisions apply if the
individual has been criticized by the CSRC twice within three years.
167. See Duli dongshi beian banfa [Methods for the Recording of Independent
Directors] (promulgated by the Shenzhen Stock Exch., May 20, 2005, effective May 20,
2005) (P.R.C.), art. 8, available at http://www.szse.cn/main/rule/ysywgz/fxywgz/200604
058434.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing full text of Methods for
Recording of Independent Directors of Shenzhen Exchange).
168. Shanghai does not appear to have similar rules.
169. Interview 2007-1. Exchange officials state that it is somewhat rare for directors at
one company to serve as directors elsewhere, although some independent directors serve
at multiple companies. Interview 2007-5.
170. Guanyu fabu "shangshi gongsi guquan jili guanli banfa" (shixing) de tongzhi
[Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Promulgating the Measures for
the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies (For Trial
Implementation)] (promulgated Dec. 31, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 8, translated in
LawlnfoChina (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (P.R.C).
171. Zhongxiao qiyeban touzizhe quanyi baohu zhiyin [Investors' Rights Protection
Guidance for the Small and Medium Enterprises Board] (promulgated by the Shenzhen
Stock Exch.,Jan. 12, 2006, effective Jan. 12, 2006) (P.R.C.), art. 43, at http://www.szse.cn/
main/rule/jysywgz/200604058452.shtmi (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Similar
provisions do not appear to apply to the primary Shenzhen board or on the Shanghai
Exchange. The Shenzhen Investors Rights guidance also requires companies to disclose in
the form of an "investors risk disclosure" serious cases of internal or public criticism, or
determinations of unfitness to serve against company directors. Id. art. 51.
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offering. 17 2 Sponsoring institutes (generally underwriters) must replace
criticized individuals serving as sponsors if they wish to proceed with an
offering. 173 CSRC regulations likewise state that the exchanges may rec-
ommend that senior managers of securities fund companies be removed
from office if they have been subject to an exchange sanction within the
past twelve months.1 74
3. Reputational Effects. - Companies and individuals fear stock ex-
change sanctions for another important reason: Reputational effects
raise the cost of doing business and can damage careers. These negative
consequences are possible because the criticisms are public. Companies
are required to disclose both the fact that they have been subject to criti-
cism from a stock exchange and the reasons for such criticism in their
annual report. 175 Criticisms, particularly multiple ones, can also contrib-
ute to a designation of a company's stock as high risk by the stock ex-
change. 1 76 Perhaps most importantly, the criticisms are virtually always
reported in the Chinese media, which ensures broad public exposure of
the fact that a company or individual has received scrutiny and criticism
by a stock exchange.
Though admittedly difficult to quantify, the reputational effects of a
criticism appear to be as or more significant than the regulatory effects
we discussed above. In China, both individual career prospects and cor-
172. Zhengquan faxing shangshi baojian zhidu zanxing banfa [Temporary Provisions
Regarding the Sponsor System for Securities Offerings and Listings] (promulgated by the
China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, Dec. 28, 2003, effective Feb. 1, 2004) (P.R.C.), art. 64,
available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n776436/n804920/n2 4 6 6 26 2 /n 3 5 6 7 6 5 2 / 3
567912.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
173. Id.
174. Zhengquan touzi jijin hangye gaoji guanli renyuan renzhi guanli ban fa
[Measures for the Administration of Operation of Securities Investment Fund]
(promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, June 29, 2004, effective July 1, 2004),
art. 6, translated in LawInfoChina (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (P.R.C.).
175. Zhongguo zhengquan jiandu guanli weiyuanhui guanyu yinfa "gongkai faxing
zhengquan de gongsi xi pilu neirong yu geshi zhun de di 2 hao niandu baogao de neirong
yu geshi" (2005 nian xiuding) de tong zhi [Notice of the CSRC Regarding Issuing the
"Standards for the Content and Form of Information Disclosure for Publicly Issued
Securities, Second Annual Report Contents and Form"] (promulgated by the China Sec.
Regulatory Comm'n, Dec. 15, 2005, effective Dec. 15, 2005) (P.R.C.), art. 46, at http://
www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n776436/n804965/n33006 9 0/n 3 3 0 0 8 3 7 /n330 4 2 3 6 / 3 3 2 7 189.
html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The 2005 notice is the most recent notice
governing the content and format of annual reports. Similar provisions regarding
disclosure of exchange public criticisms existed in notices that applied in prior years, and
are also included in the CSRC's notice governing semi-annual reports.
Although companies subject to exchange criticisms are required to disclose the fact of
the criticisms, they are not generally required to apologize. Interview 2006-1. In two cases
in our sample, however, the Shenzhen Exchange ordered sanctioned companies to issue
public apologies to stockholders. Both sanctions were issued in 2002.
176. Interview 2007-5. Both exchanges rate the quality of a company's information
disclosure, and a public criticism generally correlates with a low or nonpassing rating from
the exchanges. The Shenzhen Exchange posts the ratings on its website; the Shanghai
Exchange apparently does not make the ratings public.
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porate performance depend heavily on reputation. 177 All market partici-
pants we interviewed for this study agreed that exchange sanctions will
have a serious impact on companies' and individuals' reputations. Com-
panies fear any official exposure of wrongdoing. One exchange official
commented that criticism will result in "lots of pressure" on both the
companies and individuals who are criticized. 178 A lawyer remarked that
being sanctioned will affect investors' trust in a company, particularly
given that the market is moved by rumor. 179 Some noted the official role
of the exchanges means that exchange sanctions will send a clear mes-
sage to investors that a company's problems are severe. As the lawyer
explained, "Investors will think that [misconduct] is no big deal unless
the government cares." 180 Once the exchanges act, however, the compa-
nies will suffer negative effects. Exchange officials say that being criti-
cized will affect "society's trust in companies" as well as the jobs of corpo-
rate officials.18 1 Likewise, weakened corporate reputations may affect
profitability.18 2
For state-owned companies and their executives, exchange sanctions
may have indirect political consequences by affecting relationships with
state entities that control the company-and that designate senior com-
pany management. An exchange criticism may impede a company's abil-
ity to engage in mergers or reorganizations. The consequences for non-
state companies may be even more significant. The CEO of a Shenzhen-
listed private company facing a public criticism argued that when a state-
owned company encounters problems, banks and the local government
will offer assistance. Private companies such as hers, she said, do not en-
joy the same protections.' 8 3 The CEO explained that her firm is trying to
be known as a high quality company; receiving a public criticism "will
cause problems.' 8 4 Being sanctioned would affect the company's rela-
tionship with banks and its ability to engage in restructuring and mergers,
in addition to restricting its ability to raise additional capital. The CEO
argued that few investors pay attention to corporate disclosures, but many
take note when a company is subject to an official sanction.'8 5
177. For an extended discussion of reputation rights of companies and individuals,
see generally Benjamin L. Liebman, Innovation Through Intimidation: An Empirical
Account of Defamation Litigation in China, 47 Harv. Int'l L.J. 33 (2006) [hereinafter
Liebman, Innovation Through Intimidation] (analyzing development and use of
defamation cases in China).
178. Interview 2006-63; Interview 2007-5.
179. Interview 2007-34; Interview 2007-35.
180. Interview 2007-34; Interview 2007-35.
181. Interview 2006-72.
182. Id.
183. The company was, at the time, also being investigated by the CSRC. Interview
2007-29. In the case of individuals, however, the consequences for managers and directors
of state-owned companies appear to be as or more severe. See infra notes 191-196 and
accompanying text.
184. Interview 2007-29.
185. Id.
974 [Vol. 108:929
REPUTATIONAL SANCTIONS
The CEO also contended that the Shenzhen Exchange's more ag-
gressive strategy in recent years may create disincentives to provide accu-
rate disclosure. The CEO acknowledged that the company had engaged
in misconduct by failing to disclose certain loan guarantees, but noted
that the problems occurred in the past, before the current management
team took over. Indeed, the new management disclosed the problems:
"We tried hard to reveal [the past problems]. Now they will sanction us.
This is not fair."1 86 Were the company to be punished, the executive
argued, it would send a message to other companies that they will be
sanctioned for fully complying with disclosure obligations regarding past
misconduct: "If [the exchange] punishes us, others will be encouraged
to cover up."1 8 7 The executive conceded that an internal sanction was
appropriate, but argued that publicly shaming the company would
achieve little.1 88 China's markets are maturing, said the CEO, but the
exchanges should not move too far ahead of the market in its enforce-
ment strategy.' 8 9 Her company has made major improvements in recent
years, and in her opinion, such conduct should be encouraged rather
than punished. Echoing current central government concern with social
stability, the CEO noted the potential risk aggressive exchanges pose to
the state: The company has hundreds of workers, whose livelihoods
could be affected if the company's business suffers as a result of being
subject to a public criticism.19 0
As with sanctions on companies, the most significant effects on indi-
viduals may be intangible. Officials, lawyers, and corporate officials all
stated that the consequences of a public criticism on an individual's repu-
tation can be severe. Corporate officers and independent directors fre-
quently attempt to persuade the exchanges to sanction only the company,
not them individually.' 91 Many of the officers and directors argue either
that they were unaware of the conduct, or had no choice but to acquiesce
because they were assigned to serve as a director by the company's con-
trolling shareholder. 192 Some independent directors are academics or
well-known people who fear that the criticisms will harm their public
standing.1 93 The effects on non-independent directors' reputations can
also be severe. Non-independent directors likewise may fear that being
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. The CEO stated that being sanctioned internally would also affect an individual's
long-term job prospects, as individuals are required to disclose the fact they have been
sanctioned internally as well as publicly. But the consequences of an internal sanction
would not be as severe as those resulting from a public criticism. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Interview 2007-1; Interview 2007-5.
192. Interview 2007-5. Exchange officials comment that many such directors appear
to have virtually no prior awareness of their legal obligations as directors. See id.
193. Id.
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sanctioned may affect their ability to obtain employment in the future.19 4
Executives at state-owned companies are generally appointed by the gov-
ernment department that oversees the company. Thus, their next posi-
tion frequently is within government: As one lawyer observed, someone
who is a CEO of a state-owned company today may be appointed gover-
nor of a province next year. 19 5 Being sanctioned may affect an execu-
tive's career path within the Party-state system. 196 The CEO of the non-
state company facing a possible sanction explained the possible effects of
a public criticism: "It will harm my reputation; this looks very bad."19
7
Although none of the existing directors were at the company at the time
the misconduct occurred, the exchange had listed the current directors
as potential targets of a sanction. The executive noted that a criticism of
an individual would harm that person's ability to obtain a position at an-
other company.' 9 8 Prospective employers will see only that the individual
has been sanctioned, rather than inquiring whether the misconduct oc-
curred on the individual's watch.
D. Upshot
Investors, firms, and corporate officers in China care about stock ex-
change criticisms. Not all companies and individuals give the threat of
sanctions the same emphasis, of course, because some firms and individu-
als have less reputation to protect.199 Constraints imposed by data availa-
bility and research methodology leave some important questions unan-
swered. Principal among these is how much work the financing
constraints resulting from public criticisms are doing apart from reputa-
tional effects. 20 0 But the significance of our study does not depend on
making a precise categorization between regulatory and reputational ef-
fects. Few real world examples of pure reputational penalties exist. In
practice, damage to reputation is often associated with more tangible
penalties. The important point is that both the event study results and
our interviews indicate that the stock exchange criticisms have teeth, neg-
atively affecting a range of relationships between the firm and its various
counterparties.
194. Interview 2007-8.
195. Interview 2007-35.
196. Id.
197. Interview 2007-29.
198. Id.
199. One lawyer commented that companies with strong reputations will treat the
threat of criticism very seriously; companies already encountering difficulties may be less
concerned. Interview 2006-70. Likewise, some companies continue to disregard the threat
of exchange sanctions. Interview 2007-9.
200. Another open question is whether companies reform their governance practices
in response to or as a means of preventing stock exchange criticisms. We thank Nico
Howson for this point. We lack access to the detailed firm-level information necessary to
explore this issue.
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IV. EVALUATION
We began the Essay by noting several strands of literature related to
our research on stock exchange criticisms. In this final Part, we examine
the contributions of our research to these separate literatures. Part A
assesses the benefits and drawbacks of this form of regulation in the con-
text of the Chinese stock markets. In Part B, we consider whether this
type of informal regulation has parallels in contemporary China that
might help explain how China has grown so rapidly in the absence of a
robust, formal legal framework.
A. Reputational Sanctions in the Chinese Stock Markets
What are the benefits of using public criticisms as a regulatory tool in
the stock markets? The most obvious advantage of shaming sanctions is
low-cost enforcement. Shaming works as a punishment and a deterrent
because reputations are valuable assets, and shaming injures reputa-
tion.20 1 Our qualitative empirical assessment of public criticisms strongly
suggests that both corporate and individual reputations matter in China,
and that firms and individuals fight to stave off criticism from the stock
exchanges. We have also presented evidence that other parties shun (or
raise their price for dealing with) firms and individuals that have been
publicly criticized by the exchanges. These findings suggest that public
criticisms are doing some work in punishing and deterring improper cor-
porate conduct by listed firms in China, though we cannot make any defi-
nite claims about the extent to which this is true. The criticisms thus
provide a comparatively low-cost regulatory tool.
Shaming sanctions may be more effective where the surrounding in-
stitutional environment is comparatively devoid of alternative deterrence
and punishment mechanisms. Certainly that describes the current situa-
tion in China, where, as we have seen, the stock market is not yet sup-
ported by a robust network of enforcement institutions. The primary
market regulator, the CSRC, is well-intentioned and perhaps as aggressive
as it can be given its resource constraints and limited political breathing
room. Both the exchanges and the CSRC may be wary of taking more
draconian steps to punish offending companies, such as delisting or sus-
pending trading, out of fear of unrest from investors. But it is ill-
equipped to serve as the sole monitor of the capital markets. Share-
holder litigation, which in the United States serves as a crucial comple-
ment to SEC oversight, is simply not yet a viable means of investor protec-
tion in China. Other potential actors, such as active institutional
investors, civil society organizations, and a free financial press, are also
either missing or at a nascent stage of development. In such an environ-
ment, the stock exchange criticisms appear to be a valuable component
201. See, e.g., Kahan & Posner, supra note 10, at 368 ("By threatening a significant
blow to offenders' reputations, shaming penalties create strong economic and
psychological disincentives .. ").
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of China's current regulatory regime. Perhaps their role will fade as sur-
rounding institutions develop greater capacity, but currently they seem to
be gaining in importance in the regulatory regime.
China's stock market development to date provides important com-
parative support for the literature on stock exchanges as investor safe-
guards. Of course, the Chinese context is distinctive and cannot be
squarely equated with the historical experience of the United States or
the United Kingdom that inspired this literature. But within the distinc-
tive constraints of contemporary Chinese institutions and politics, stock
exchange criticisms appear to be an innovative and proactive experiment
in investor protection to raise the quality and stature of the stock market.
The experience of the Shenzhen Exchange in particular highlights the
role of self-interest as a motivation to provide investor protection. To
compete effectively, exchanges must be concerned about the governance
practices of listed companies and the quality of the information disclo-
sure regime. This motivation holds even where, as in China, the ex-
changes are extensions of the state rather than private membership orga-
nizations. The London and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges pioneered the
use of public criticisms as a regulatory device to improve investor protec-
tion. Acting on similar motivation, mainland Chinese stock exchanges
appear to have effectively transplanted this regulatory technique into a
more state-centered market system.
The benefits of the stock exchange criticisms as deployed in China,
however, appear to extend beyond investor protection. We find particu-
larly intriguing the fact that other regulators and market actors are begin-
ning to piggyback on the stock exchange criticisms. As shown above, the
CSRC now ties capital raising and independent director criteria to the
stock exchange sanctions. The central bank is making use of the infor-
mation produced by the stock exchanges in building a national credit
rating system. Available evidence suggests banks already take account of
the criticisms in their loan decisions at some level. And somewhat more
speculatively, prosecutors and political actors appear to use the sanctions
as a signaling device to identify "bad actors" whose conduct requires spe-
cial scrutiny. Although arguably the use of sanctions by other state actors
proves that the sanctions themselves are toothless-and that the ex-
changes rely on other institutions (and in particular the CSRC) in order
to punish offenders-we disagree. Stock exchange criticisms have be-
come a focal point for further regulatory development and market polic-
ing. The exchanges, by criticizing companies, can set in motion a range
of responses from other institutions. Cooperative interactions among
governmental and market actors are expanding the scope and impact of
the stock exchange criticisms.
We do not claim that shaming is necessarily more effective in China
than elsewhere. But reputational sanctions may have particular force in
China given both the underdeveloped status of China's legal institutions
and the strong emphasis on reputation evident in Chinese society to-
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day. 2 0 2 The use and effectiveness of shaming sanctions is also not surpris-
ing given China's legal history. Shaming played an important role in
China's imperial legal system, most notably in the wearing of the cangue,
and in the Chinese legal system prior to the reform era. Shaming as a
mechanism of political and social governance played a major role during
the Cultural Revolution, suggesting some type of cultural or social affinity
for this tool of public ordering, at least among those in positions of au-
thority. Indeed, one explanation for why Chinese law provides robust
protection for reputation rights today-in particular when contrasted
with other forms of individual rights-is a desire to avoid the reputation-
based attacks of the Cultural Revolution.
Public criticisms, like any other form of regulation, have costs and
limitations. As Dan Kahan and Eric Posner have noted, there is no rea-
son to believe that the level of deterrence provided by shaming sanctions
is optimal, because the reputational injury to the offender depends on
highly idiosyncratic variables that are not fully known to the government
(in our case, the exchange) when it imposes the penalty. 20 3 Plainly, the
level of deterrence provided by the stock exchange criticisms has been
insufficient to prevent significant levels of bad conduct in the Chinese
stock market, as evidenced by the number of companies that have re-
ceived two or more sanctions. Moreover, though the criticisms may be a
relatively cheap form of enforcement for the government, they may be
costly to society. This is particularly true if the stock exchanges impose
criticisms erroneously or for motives unconnected to investor protection.
We have no evidence that this occurs, but the procedural vagueness sur-
rounding the sanction decisions and the lack of a formal appeal mecha-
nism are certainly cause for concern. Even where criticisms of listed firms
are 100% accurate and well-intentioned, shaming a corporation can ad-
versely affect the reputations of individuals who were not involved in the
wrongdoing.
Expanding the focus somewhat, our study offers a new perspective
on the small body of literature discussing the role of the media in corpo-
rate governance. The principal conclusion of this literature, which fo-
cuses exclusively on investor reaction in Russia, is that international me-
dia exposure can be a useful corrective to corporate governance
problems, particularly in a transition economy, by amplifying the reputa-
tional cost of misbehavior.20 4 Our study of the Chinese situation both
supports and departs from this conclusion. Clearly the sanctions gain
force through publication in the media. It also seems likely that in some,
and perhaps many, cases the stock exchange and the CSRC first learn of
corporate misconduct through the media. Indeed, the interaction be-
202. See Liebman, Innovation Through Intimidation, supra note 177, at 83-84
(discussing cultural and historical importance of reputation in China).
203. See Kahan & Posner, supra note 10, at 372-73.
204. See Dyck & Zingales, Media, supra note 13, at 30 (concluding that media plays
"important role in shaping corporate policy").
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tween the stock exchanges and the media seems crucial to the function-
ing of this system of punishment and deterrence. Here too, we see col-
laboration among separate institutions as a means of creating a novel
form of informal regulation. The stock exchanges use the media to pub-
licize the sanctions, and media coverage increases the reputational effect
on the offender.2 0 5 However, in China, it is domestic, not international,
media coverage that matters. We are unaware of any reference, let alone
coverage, of Chinese stock exchange criticisms in the international me-
dia. Also note that the reputational impact of the criticisms (and media
coverage thereof) extends well beyond the investing public, to encompass
other regulators, banks, government officials, and prospective employees
of corporate management.
At first glimpse the important role of China's non-free media in cor-
porate governance issues might appear counterintuitive. In practice,
however, the Chinese media enjoy significantly more autonomy in report-
ing on financial misconduct than they do reporting on most other areas
of Chinese law and society. The media are perhaps the most effective
regulator of corporate wrongdoing in China today. China's leadership
has clearly recognized the valuable role the media can play in curbing
corporate misdeeds-even as they continue to limit the media's ability to
report on many other areas. And the Chinese media remain arms of the
Chinese Party-state: There are virtually no privately owned media outlets
in China.20 6 The Chinese media's long history of serving as both a state
mouthpiece and as an important intelligence-gathering institution for
Party-state leaders results in media whose reports are often particularly
influential. 207
B. Extending the Lessons from this Study
Might the recent experience of exchange sanctions hold lessons for
other areas where underenforcement of law remains a problem in China?
We are wary of declaring reputational sanctions to have extensive applica-
tion outside the corporate governance context. The recent use of sham-
ing sanctions by the Chinese police against prostitutes in Shenzhen
touched off widespread outrage and condemnation within China, reflect-
205. Cf. id. at 31 ("[T]he extent of press influence may be largely outside
policymakers' control.").
206. Pursuant to a decision issued by the PRC State Council in April 2005, nonpublic/
non-state capital shall not invest, establish, or operate any news agencies, publication
entities, radio stations, or television stations. See Guowuyuan guanyu fei gongyou ziben
jinru wenhua canye de ruogan jueding [State Council Decisions on the Entrance of
Nonpublic Capital into Cultural Industries] (promulgated by the St. Council, Apr. 13,
2005, effective Apr. 13, 2005) (P.R.C.), art. 9, available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/
content/2005/content_64188.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
207. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue, supra note 53, at I ("Over the past decade,
the Chinese media have emerged as among the most influential actors in the Chinese legal
system.").
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ing how far China has come since the pre-reform era.20 8 But our findings
are also consistent with the view, set forth by one of us elsewhere, that
public exposure may be the single most effective tool for combating
wrongdoing in China today.20 9 Some of the institutional characteristics
of China's stock exchanges are unique. For example, the exchanges do
not have close political ties to the companies they oversee, as stock ex-
change officials are appointed by the CSRC, not local governments, and
most of the companies that they oversee are not from their local jurisdic-
tions. Local protectionism thus appears to be a far less significant factor
than it is in many areas in which China suffers from underenforcement of
laws and regulations. Nevertheless, even in areas where local protection-
ism is a major problem, including perhaps most notably environmental
law, there may be lessons from the experiences of China's stock ex-
changes: Limited devolution of power to even moderately autonomous
institutions may have a significant effect. And targeting the reputations
of wrongdoers may be more practical, and more effective, than more
complicated or cumbersome enforcement actions that rely upon a host of
complementary enforcement institutions.
Despite our hesitation to generalize far beyond the confines of the
stock market, it is tantalizing to consider whether the phenomenon of
informal regulatory innovation exists more broadly in contemporary
China. Our study provides one of the most concrete examples available
of a phenomenon other scholars2 10 have argued is key to China's eco-
nomic growth in the absence of robust legal institutions-reputational
mechanisms to support market activity. In the case of China's securities
market, the threat of reputational sanctions appears to provide the ex-
changes with significant leverage to achieve the primary goal of any secur-
ities regulatory regime-namely, corporate disclosure of material infor-
mation. Moreover, the purely reputational effects of the sanctions are
buttressed by formal rules restricting the financing ability of firms subject
to public criticism. Whatever its shortcomings, this scheme of regulation
appears to be simultaneously providing a measure of investor protection
and serving as the basis for more formal regulatory efforts to bolster the
quality of information relevant to equity and bank finance. Of course,
considerable research is needed to determine whether similar examples
of informal institutional support for China's economic growth can be
found outside the securities markets. But we now have at least one con-
crete example in support of the informal institutions theory. If more can
be uncovered and analyzed, scholars might make headway on the ex-
tremely important question of how China has succeeded in growing so
208. See Mark Magnier, Campaign of Shame Falls Flat in China, L.A. Times, Dec. 18,
2006, at A4.
209. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue, supra note 53, at 7 ("Many in China insist
that the media are the single most important and effective avenue for citizen redress.").
210. See Allen et al., Economic Growth, supra note 12, at 59-61, 96-99.
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rapidly for three decades in the absence of a rule of law, at least as that
condition is commonly understood.21 1
Adding to our sense that there may be broader lessons to be gleaned
from this example, the phenomenon we have explored in this Essay has
parallels with other reforms at the edges of the Chinese legal system. As
one of us has pointed out in a different context, the Chinese legal system
contains space for innovation by a range of actors. 2 12 Experimentation
and devolution of lawmaking or law enforcement activity are common to
legal reforms across a range of substantive and institutional areas in
China. In the case of stock market regulation, we see a modest devolu-
tion of authority and the creation of multiple, overlapping lines of regula-
tory authority. Hence we see explicit and implicit devolution of authority
by the CSRC to the exchanges. In a system where rival interests and insti-
tutional capacity may make it hard for CSRC to play a greater oversight
role, devolution is becoming an effective tool. The dynamic seems famil-
iar even if the context is new.
The recent experience in China's securities market may be particu-
larly noteworthy because although experimentation and devolution in
lawmaking and in economic policymaking are common in China, devolu-
tion of enforcement powers has been less successful. Local protectionism
is perhaps the single biggest problem undermining China's efforts to
strengthen its legal system, and the combination of devolved authority
and local protectionism frequently leads to underenforcement. In the
case of exchange sanctions, however, devolved authority is contributing
to more effective oversight-in part because of the absence of local pro-
tectionism (or perhaps more accurately, because the local incentives op-
erating on the exchanges favor stronger, rather than weaker, enforce-
ment), and in part because the exchanges have relied on reputational
sanctions, rather than more formal punishments. The exchanges' institu-
tional interests in expanding their own authority and influence have
played an important role in such developments. Modest forms of regula-
tory competition are also emerging between the two exchanges, and may
likewise be providing exchanges with an incentive to expand their influ-
ence. Perhaps other agencies and organs of the state will take notice of
the potentially salutary effects of regulatory competition and innovation
outside the confines of their tightly prescribed roles in China's system of
governance.
211. For further analysis of this question, see Curtis J. Milhaupt & Katharina Pistor,
Law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal About Legal Systems and Economic
Growth Around the World (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 3-4, 14, on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
212. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue, supra note 53, at 107-08 (noting that
Chinese media "are one of many competing Party-state institutions seeking to solve
problems, expand influence, and force actions by others").
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CONCLUSION
We have examined China's legal and self-regulatory strategies for
capital market development. In the process, we have uncovered a feature
of Chinese securities regulation that has thus far received almost no at-
tention: the role of reputational sanctions imposed by the stock ex-
changes as a mechanism of punishment and deterrence in the capital
market. Our empirical evidence and interview results strongly suggest
that the stock exchange criticisms prompt disclosure of information the
market finds significant, while the fact that a company has been criticized
constitutes a new and significant piece of information. Although this reg-
ulatory mechanism takes an unorthodox form, the criticisms are helping
construct a more robust Chinese capital market. Data limitations do not
permit us to completely rule out less benign interpretations of the event
study results such as political favoritism or the workings of an inefficient
market. But the evidence we have produced and analyzed suggests the
stock exchanges have carved out a meaningful, if limited, self-regulatory
role for themselves despite severe institutional constraints on their
independence.
The broader lessons from this experiment for Chinese law generally
may not be known for years. But one conclusion is clear from our study:
New forms of governance are being created in the interstices of what we
normally perceive to be a clear dichotomy between state and private regu-
lation of the securities markets. China's institution-building exercise in
the area of capital markets is worth understanding at a deep level of insti-
tutional detail, not only for its own sake, but because it may offer tanta-
lizing evidence of how new forms of regulation are supporting economic
growth. Much more work needs to be done on this larger question, of
course. But we hope this Essay represents a first step in achieving that
deeper level of understanding.
2008] 983
